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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is focused on building scalable Attribute Based Security Systems
(ABSS), including efficient and privacy-preserving attribute based encryption schemes
and applications to group communications and cloud computing.
First of all, a Constant Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CCP-ABE) is
proposed. Existing Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) schemes usually incur large, lin-
early increasing ciphertext. The proposed CCP-ABE dramatically reduces the cipher-
text to small, constant size. This is the first existing ABE scheme that achieves constant
ciphertext size. Also, the proposed CCP-ABE scheme is fully collusion-resistant such
that users can not combine their attributes to elevate their decryption capacity.
Next step, efficient ABE schemes are applied to construct optimal group communica-
tion schemes and broadcast encryption schemes. An attribute based Optimal Group
Key (OGK) management scheme that attains communication-storage optimality with-
out collusion vulnerability is presented. Then, a novel broadcast encryption model:
Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE) is introduced, which exploits the many-
to-many nature of attributes to dramatically reduce the storage complexity from linear
to logarithm and enable expressive attribute based access policies.
The privacy issues are also considered and addressed in ABSS. Firstly, a hidden policy
based ABE schemes is proposed to protect receivers’ privacy by hiding the access pol-
icy. Secondly,a new concept: Gradual Identity Exposure (GIE) is introduced to address
the restrictions of hidden policy based ABE schemes. GIE’s approach is to reveal the
receivers’ information gradually by allowing ciphertext recipients to decrypt the mes-
sage using their possessed attributes one-by-one. If the receiver does not possess one
attribute in this procedure, the rest of attributes are still hidden. Compared to hidden-
policy based solutions, GIE provides significant performance improvement in terms of
reducing both computation and communication overhead.
ii
Last but not least, ABSS are incorporated into the mobile cloud computing scenarios.
In the proposed secure mobile cloud data management framework, the light weight
mobile devices can securely outsource expensive ABE operations and data storage to
untrusted cloud service providers. The reported scheme includes two components: (1) a
Cloud-Assisted Attribute-Based Encryption/Decryption (CA-ABE) scheme and (2) An
Attribute-Based Data Storage (ABDS) scheme that achieves information theoretical
optimality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the traditional public key security systems, the communication model is one-to-one.
Messages encrypted by a particular public key can only be decrypted by the
corresponding private key. The same fact holds for Identity Based Encryption (IBE),
where the public key can be any arbitrary string identifying the user.
Attributes are descriptive strings that define, classify or annotate the objects to which
they are assigned. Each user is tagged with multiple attributes while each attribute is
shared by a number of users. In other words, the mapping between attributes and users
is many-to-many. When used with different collections and organizations, attributes
enable efficient and scalable identification and classification of users.
An Attribute Based Security System (ABSS) takes advantage of many-to-many nature
of attributes to facilitate flexible security functions. Many applications can be
leveraged by the ABSS. For example, in university, a confidential document needs to
be encrypted and can only be accessible to professors in Computer Science (CS)
department and Electrical Engineering (EE) department. In this example, it is
inefficient to use pairwise or one-to-one public key schemes since the size of
ciphertext and number of encryption operations are linear on the number of intended
receivers.
In Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE), the encryptor can
enforce, with encryption, an expressive access policy on who can decrypt the message.
Only users whose attributes satisfy this access policy can decrypt the ciphertext. In the
previous example, the documents can be protected by the access policy: f”Professor”
AND f”EE” OR ”CS”gg to protect the data. Bob, who has attributes f ”Professor” ,
”EE” g, can decrypt and view Alice’s pictures but Carol, who has attributes f
1
”Associate Professor” , ”CS” g can not access the data.
1.1 Efficient Attribute Based Encryption
Apart from the promising features provided by CP-ABE solutions, the existing
CP-ABE schemes usually incur large, linearly increasing ciphertext. In the those
CP-ABE schemes [7, 26, 53, 70, 42, 91], the size of a ciphertext increases linearly
with respect to the number of included attributes. For example, the ciphertext size in
BSW CP-ABE [7] starts at about 650 bytes, and each additional attribute adds about
250 300 bytes.
To sovle this problem, a novel CP-ABE construction, named Constant-size Ciphertext
Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CCP-ABE) is proposed, which incurs
constant-size of ciphertext, regardless of the number of attributes in a logical AND
data access policy with wildcards. Besides the encrypted message and encoded access
policy, each ciphertext only requires 2 bilinear group elements, which are bounded by
300 bytes in total. The proposed Constant Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based
Encryption (CCP-ABE) is presented in Section 4.3.
1.2 Optimal Group Communication Based on ABE
Next step, Efficient ABE schemes are applied to optimally secure group
communications.
Multicast is used to distribute data to a group of receivers efficiently. The efficiency
can be achieved because a datagram is transmitted once at the source and traverses
once at any forwarding link in the network, saving the cost of the sender as well as
network bandwidth. To scale up to a large receivers population, multicast group is
OPEN when designed. For example, receivers can join or leave a multicast group
freely by sending an IGMP message to their neighbor routers. The IP multicast model
has been described as ”You put packets in at one end, and the network conspires to
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deliver them to anyone who asks” by Dave Clark.
Many applications require access control for data multicasted by the central data
source; i.e. communication model is one-to-many. For instance, in pay-per-view TV,
only valid subscribers are able to access the media multicasted by the station.
Moreover, some applications also enables each user to initialize a subgroup
dynamically; i.e. communication model is many-to-many. An exemplary application
is dynamic conference, where a user can dynamically setup a online conferencing with
other users.
To secure the one-to-many multicast groups with membership changes, I proposed an
Optimal Group Key (OGK) scheme that achieves the optimal balance between storage
and communication overhead. A new optimality concept, named
storage-communication-optimality, is defined by considering both storage overhead
and communication overhead. The storage-communication-optimality condition
ensures that removing multiple members requires minimal number of multicasted
messages. OGK is the first work that achieves storage-communication-optimality
without colluding vulnerabilities. It out-performs all existing tree-based group key
management schemes in terms of communication efficiency.
While the OGK can be used to secure one-to-many data distribution from centralized
sources, broadcast encryption schemes support many-to-many communication model,
where any data senders are able to communicate any receivers. In this dissertation, the
Broadcast Encryption is generalized to Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption
(ABBE). In existing Broadcast Encryption, the encryptor must explicitly specify a list
of intended decryptors and encrypt the message using public keys of all decryptors.
However, in many scenarios, it is natural that the encryptor does not have the complete
list of decryptors on hand when encrypting the data. Moreover, in large scale system,
storing every user’s public key is expensive and infeasible. In ABBE, encryptor does
not need to explicitly specify the list of decryptors and the number of stored public
3
keys is small (O(logN)) when the number of users (N) is large.
1.3 Privacy Preserving Attribute Based System
Existing Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) schemes do not efficiently protect
receivers’ privacy and the access policies describing the eligible receivers are
disclosed. To solve this problem, two models were proposed.
In the first model the access policy is removed or protected [53, 69, 96]. Under this
model, I proposed the first hidden policy constant size ABE (HPC-ABE), which is the
first hidden policy ABE with constant size ciphertext.
Hidden policy ABE schemes require every user to try decrypting all received
ciphertext using all the attributes they possess, which incurs great computation
overhead and restrict the flexibility of access policy. To address this issue, a new
concept: Gradual Identity Exposure (GIE) is proposed to protect data receivers’
identity. GIE’s approach is to reveal the receivers’ information gradually by allowing
ciphertext recipients to decrypt the message using their possessed attributes
one-by-one. If the receiver fails to possess one attribute in a particular step, the rest of
attributes will remain hidden and the real receivers’ privacy is preserved. Compared to
hidden-policy based solutions, GIE provides significant performance improvement in
terms of reducing computation and communication overhead. the unintended receivers
quit decryption procedure as early as possible to save computing power. This is
fundamentally different to the rigid concept of using hidden policy: “Try to decrypt
the entire ciphertext, if it is decrypted, the policy will be revealed; otherwise, policy
will be absolutely unknown”, where most receivers will waste computing power on
unintended ciphers. Also, GIE is flexible in that it does not require a pre-established
policy agreement. Each user can specify a procedure to expose an identity gradually,
based on his/her security requirements. This property makes the identity management
adaptable in various un-predictable application scenarios. Moreover, a information
4
theoretical framework is proposed to model the information leakage in the GIE with
several new proposed concepts.
1.4 Mobile Cloud Computing Perspective
The final part of this dissertation is about applying ABSS to mobile cloud computing
environments. Existing cloud provides two main services: storage and computation.
Users’ concerns about data security are the main obstacles that prevent the public
cloud from widely adopted. These concerns origin from the fact that sensitive data are
stored and processed in public clouds, which are operated by commercial service
providers and shared by various other customers. Along with the other customers who
can be potential competitors or malicious attackers, these service providers, especially,
the storage and computing service providers, are usually not trusted by the data owner.
With the fast development of wireless technology, mobile cloud has become an
emerging cloud service model [50], in which mobile devices and sensors are used as
the information collecting and processing nodes for the cloud infrastructure. This new
trend demands researchers and practitioners to construct a trustworthy architecture for
mobile cloud computing, which includes a large numbers of lightweight,
resource-constrained mobile devices.
With the ABSS enabled cloud storage service, a new challenge is how to incorporate
wireless mobile devices, especially lightweight devices such as cell phones and
sensors, into the cloud system. This new challenge is originated from the fact that
ABSS always require intensive computing resources to run the encryption and
decryption algorithms. To address this issue, an effective solution is to outsource the
heavy encryption and decryption computation without exposing the sensitive data
contents or keys to the cloud service providers. The proposed research described in
this paper proposes such a solution for CP-ABE.
Another research challenge is how to share encrypted data with a large number of
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users, in which the data sharing group can be changed frequently. For example, when
a user is revoked from accessing a file, he/she is not authorized to access any future
updates of the file, i.e., the local copy (if exists) will get outdated. To this end, the
updated data need to be encrypted by a new encryption key.
Furthermore, the third research challenge is how to upload/download and update
encrypted data stored in the cloud system. For example, when changing certain data
fields of an encrypted database, the encrypted data needs to be downloaded from cloud
and then be decrypted. Upon finishing the updates, the files need to be re-encrypted
and uploaded to the cloud system. Frequent upload/download operations will cause
tremendous overhead for resource constrained wireless devices. Thus, it is desirable to
design a secure and efficient cloud data management scheme to balance the
communication and storage operational overhead incurred by managing the encrypted
data.
To address the above described research challenges, I proposed a holistic secure
mobile cloud data management framework that includes two major components:
1. A Cloud-Assisted Attribute-Based Encryption/Decryption (CA-ABE) scheme;
2. An Attribute-Based Data Storage (ABDS) scheme with balanced
communication and storage operational overheads.
Using CA-ABE, users can securely outsource computation intensive CP-ABE
encryption and decryption operations to the cloud without revealing data content and
secret keys. In this way, lightweight and resource constrained devices can access and
manage data stored in the cloud data store.
The ABDS system achieves scalable and fine-grained data access control, using public
cloud services. Based on ABDS, users’ attributes are organized in a carefully
constructed hierarchy so that the cost of membership revocation can be minimized.
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Moreover, ABDS is suitable for mobile computing to balance communication and
storage overhead, and thus reduces the cost of data management operations (such as
upload, updates, etc.) for both the mobile cloud nodes and storage service providers.
1.5 Design Goals
The design goal of the Attribute Based Security Systems is to provide efficient
security features using novel construction of attribute based encryption primitives.
Compared with traditional cryptographic systems, ABSS exploits the many-to-many
nature of Attributes to achieve optimal communication and storage trade-offs:
• Communication Overhead: The communication overhead of many-to-many
communication should be less than linear O(N) or sublinear O(
p
N)on the
number of data receivers. In this design, the actual communication is
approximately O(logN).
• Storage Overhead: The storage overhead incurred on the users and controllers
should be less than linear O(N) or sublinear O(
p
N)on the number of users in
the system. By exploiting the many-to-many nature of attributes, the proposed
design can achieve the minimal storage overhead O(logN).
• Privacy Preserving: The privacy of users in the ABSS should be preserved.
Especially, this design focuses on the receiver anonymity and proposed
mechanisms to protect the receivers’ identities from exposed to unauthorized
users.
• Mobile Cloud Computing Perspective: Cloud computing is a emerging
computing paradigm and is evolving to cooperate with wireless mobile
networks in the near future. In this design, light-weight mobile devices are
integrated into ABSS and mechanisms are provided to securely outsourcing
communication and storage to cloud.
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Chapter 2
Related Works
In this section, I summarize the related works to this dissertation.
2.1 Attribute Based Encryption
The research of Attribute Based Encryption can be traced back to Identity Based
Encryption (IBE) [83, 28, 20, 12, 9, 38]. In Identity Based Encryption (IBE), an
identity or ID is an string one-to-one mapped to each user. A user can acquire a
private key corresponding to his/her ID in an off-line manner from trusted authority
and the ID is used as public key. The ciphertext encrypted by a particular ID can only
be decrypted by the user with corresponding private key, i.e., the encryption is
one-to-one. The first fully functional IBE scheme was proposed in [12].
Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) was first proposed as a fuzzy version of IBE in
[79], where an identity is considered as a set of descriptive attributes. The private key
for an identity w can decrypt the message encrypted by the identity w0 if and only if w
and w0 are closer to each other than a pre-defined threshold in terms of set overlap
distance metric. In the paper [73], the authors further generalize the threshold-based
set overlap distance metric to expressive access policies with AND and OR gates.
Afterwards, there are two main variants of ABE proposed so far, namely Key Policy
Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE [43]) and Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based
Encryption (CP-ABE [7, 26, 53, 70, 42, 91, 92, 24]). In KP-ABE, each ciphertext is
associated with a set of attributes and each user’s private key is embedded with an
access policy. Decryption is enabled only if the attributes on the ciphertext satisfy the
access policy of the user’s private key. In CP-ABE [7, 26, 53, 70, 42, 91, 34, 48, 8],
each user’s private key is associated with a set of attributes and each ciphertext is
encrypted by an access policy. To decrypt the message, the attributes in the user
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private key need to satisfy the access policy. The key difference between identity and
attribute is identities are many-to-one mapped to users while attributes are
many-to-many mapped to users.
Researchers have considered similar problems without considering collusion attacks
[86, 64, 5, 19, 2, 6]. A more general model is called Predicate Encryption
[88, 11, 1, 18, 85]. These systems have the advantages of hiding the associated access
structures themselves and thus providing a level of “anonymity”. The down side is the
Predicate Encryption is not so expressive compared with ABE.
Although ABE schemes have shown their strong capability to construct a flexible data
access control model, existing ABE schemes suffers from large ciphertext size
problem. In [34], the authors proposed a CP-ABE scheme with constant size
conjunctive headers. However, their scheme does not support wildcards (or
do-not-care) in the conjunctive access policies. To decrypt a ciphertext, the
decryptor’s attributes need to be identical to the access policy. In other words, the
model is still one-to-one, i.e., an access policy is satisfied by one attribute list or ID,
which makes the the number of access policy increase exponentially (In a system with
n attributes, the number of attribute combinations is 2n. Without wildcard, one needs
2n access policies to express all combinations. On the other hand, one can use a single
access policy with wildcards to express all combinations of attributes.) Thus, their
scheme can be simply implemented using IBE schemes with same efficiency by using
each user’s attribute list as his/her ID. I also note that Herranz et al. [48] has recently
proposed more general construction of CP-ABE with constant ciphertext
independently. Their proposed scheme achieves constant ciphertext with any
monotonic threshold data access policy, e.g. n-of-n (AND), 1-of-n (OR) and m-of-n.
However, compared with the proposed PP-CP-ABE, their scheme does not support the
non-monotonic data access policy and the recipient anonymity.
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2.2 Multicast Group Key Management
Multicast key distribution schemes have been investigated intensively in past two
decades. Some of the works include but not limited to
[22, 21, 57, 58, 31, 72, 93, 36, 63, 65, 78, 94]. Due to the richness of related research, I
cannot list all the related work in this area. I refer to [67, 75] as two excellent surveys.
The rooted-tree structure (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2) is constructed such that each
group member is assigned a unique leaf node in the tree. Every node in the tree,
including leaf and non-leaf nodes, is assigned a unique auxiliary secret. Each group
member is pre-distributed a set of auxiliary symmetric secrets (or keys) that are along
the path from the leaf to the root, in which the root secret is GK for the entire group.
Using rooted-tree based solutions, an auxiliary secret can be shared among a partition
of members, and a member can be involved in multiple partitions. Typically, the a-ary
rooted-tree based solutions require O(logaN) storage overhead for each member [21],
where N is the group size. The rooted-tree based multicast group key distribution
scheme can be divided into two categories: Non-Flat-Table schemes (Figure 2.1) and
Flat-Table schemes (Figure 2.2).
Non-Flat-Table include most famous rooted-tree based schemes, such at OFT [84],
LKH [93], and ELK [71]). One important feature of these schemes is there are ad
distinct secrets at level d in the key distribution tree as illustrated in Figure 2.1. In
other words, each node is associated with a unique secret. I note that the secrets are
not necessarily just pre-distributed random symmetric keys [93]. They may be
generated using one-way hash function [84] or pseudo random number generator [71].
Non-Flat-Table schemes only improves the efficiency marginally. This is because, in
these solutions, based on the logaN pre-distributed auxiliary keys, each group member
can merely decrypt logN encrypted streams, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of two kinds of tree structures. Tree (a) is used in non-flat table
schemes and tree (b) is used in flat table scheme.
Figure 2.2: Illustration of two kinds of tree structures. Tree (a) is used in non-flat table
schemes and tree (b) is used in flat table scheme.
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Flat-Table schemes [23, 22] adopt a slightly different construction, as illustrated in
Figure 2.2. In Flat-Table schemes, each group member is issued a unique binary ID
b0b1 : : :bn 2bn 1 of length n. In addition to the GK, group controller generates 2n
auxiliary key encryption keys (KEK) fKi;bji 2 f0; : : : ;n 1g;b 2 f0;1gg. A group
member with ID b0b1 : : :bn 2bn 1 holds KEKs fKi;biji 2 f0; : : : ;n 1gg. The KEKs
are organized in the key distribution tree in Figure 2.2, where each level corresponding
to one bit position in a user’s ID. Thus, at each level in the Flat-Table key distribution
tree, there are exact 2 distinct KEKs, which map to a bit position in ID. For example,
in the Figure 2.2, member with ID 011 is pre-distributedfK11;K22;K32g. In Flat-Table,
the number of partitions each group member can participate is maximized to
2logN 1= N 1.
Despite its efficiency, Flat-Table schemes are vulnerable to collusion attacks since FT
solutions simply adopt the symmetric KEKs. For example, GMs 001 and 010 can
decrypt ciphertexts destined to other GMs, e.g., 011, 000, by combining their
symmetric KEKs. To prevent the collusion attacks, Cheung et al. [25] proposed
CP-ABE-FT to implement the FT using CP-ABE. However, message size of
CP-ABE-FT is linearly growing [25] and, thus, the communication overhead is
actually log2N. As a contrast, OGK features collusion resistance and a constant
message size. Thus, the OGK communication overhead is logN. Also, CP-ABE-FT
utilizes a periodic refreshment mechanism to ensure forward secrecy. If the ID of a
revoked GM is re-assigned to another GM before the refreshment, the revoked GM can
regain the access to group data and then the group forward secrecy is compromised.
2.3 Broadcast Encryption
Broadcast Encryption (BE) was introduced by Fiat and Naor in [37]. In BE, a
broadcaster encrypts a message for some set of users who are listening to a
broadcasting channel and use their private keys to decrypt the message. Compared
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with traditional one-to-one encryption schemes, BE is very efficient. Instead of
sending messages encrypted with each individual recipient’s public key, the broadcast
encryptor broadcast one encrypted message to be decrypted by multiple eligible
recipients with their own private keys.
Based on different tradeoffs between storage and communication overhead, existing
BE schemes can be generally categorized into the following classes: (1) constant
ciphertext, linear public and/or private key on number of total receivers [13, 30]; (2)
linear ciphertext on number of revoked receivers, constant (or logarithm) public and/or
private key, [30, 68, 10, 55, 59]; (3) sublinear ciphertext, sublinear public and/or
private key [13, 15]. If I denote the number of excluded or revoked receivers as r and
total number of receivers as N, class (1) is more suitable for the case (N  r) N;
class (2) is more efficient when r N and class (3) can be used in most cases with
balanced performance.
Although existing class (1) BE schemes feature constant ciphertext size, the storage
overhead incurred by public/private keys is linearly proportional to the max number of
non-colluding users in the system. In the case of the fully collusion-resistant BE
systems, the number of public key stored by each user equals to the number of users in
the system. In a system with N users, where N is a large number, the set of public keys
fPKiji= 1 : : :Ng is huge and it is infeasible for each user to pre-load all public keys.
Although it is possible to follow a PKI manner to issue certificate for each user, the
encrypter needs to contact each each recipient to acquire the certificate or the
encrypter needs to download the public keys from a centralized server, which is very
costly and greatly undermined efficiency of BE. Although class (3) schemes tried to
reduce the complexity of storing public keys to sublinear, the size of ciphertext is also
increased to sublinear, which can still be huge in large system. As for the class (2) BE
schemes, they are very efficient when r N. However, as the increase of r, the
efficiency of class (2) schemes drops linearly. In this work, I proposed a new
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construction of ABBE scheme to address the deficiency of all 3 class existing works.
Particularly, ABBE supports any arbitrary number of receivers with much lower
complexity of storage and communication.
The encrypter in the existing BE schemes need to specify the receiver list for a
particular message. In many scenarios, it is very hard to know the complete receiver
list and it is desirable to be able to encrypt without exact knowledge of possible
receivers. Also, existing BE schemes can only support simple receiver list. It is hard
to support flexible, expressive access control policies. An broadcast encryption with
attribute based mechanism was proposed in [60], where expressive attribute based
access policy replaces the flat receiver list. Also, in [25, 26], the authors proposed to
use CP-ABE [7, 26] and flat-table [23] mechanism to minimize the number of
messages and support expressive access policy. Compared with these works, the
proposed scheme significantly reduce the size of ciphertext from linear to constant.
2.4 Privacy Preserving Attribute Based Security System
Privacy Enhancing Identity Management System (PE-IMS) was discussed by Hansen
et al. in [45]. To support PE-IMS, the anonymous IBE schemes [11, 18, 38] preserve
recipient anonymity by hiding the identity in the ciphertext. To protect the privacy of
access policy, KSW scheme [53], NYO scheme [69] and YRL1 scheme [95] were
proposed, where the encryptor specified access policy is hidden. Also, YRL2 scheme
was proposed in [96] based on BSW scheme [7] as a group key management scheme
providing group membership anonymity.
I proposed a new construction, called Privacy Preserving Constant size Attribute
Based Encryption (PPC-CP-ABE) with hidden policy to preserve privacy efficiently.
The proposed scheme significantly reduced the size of ciphertext to constant, while all
existing hidden policy solutions requires ciphertext that is linearly increasing on the
number of attributes in the hidden policy.
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Furthermore, I also proposed a novel alternative model, named Gradual Identity
Exposure (GIE) [51] to the hidden policy schemes. Existing hidden policy policy
attribute based encryption scheme is those schemes require all receivers to ”try”
decrypting all ciphertexts they received. Only after the receivers finished the
decryption process can they know whether they are allowed to decrypt. Thus, these
schemes pose a huge computational burden on all receivers. On the other hand, with
the property of gradual exposing of attributes, receivers can detect ciphertexts that are
not intended for them earlier to save computational power.
2.5 Mobile Cloud Computing Perspective
Cryptographic access control over untrusted storage is investigated in both
cryptography community and networking community. In cryptography community,
Broadcast Encryption (BE) was introduced by Fiat and Naor in [37]. Compared with
traditional one-to-one encryption schemes, BE is very efficient. Based on tradeoffs
between key storage and ciphertext storage overhead, existing BE schemes can be
generally categorized into the following classes: (i) constant ciphertext, linear public
and/or private key on number of total receivers [13]; (ii) linear ciphertext on number
of revoked receivers, constant (or logarithm) public and/or private key, [30, 68, 10];
(iii) sub-linear ciphertext, sub-linear public and/or private key [13]. In this work, I
proposed a new construction of attribute based data storage (ABDS) scheme to address
the deficiency of all 3 class existing works. Particularly, ABDS supports any arbitrary
number of receivers with much lower complexity of storage and communication.
In networking community, various encrypted file systems [52, 41, 4, 32] were
proposed to secure data over untrusted storage. Particularly, in [4], the authors
proposed a distributed storage scheme where users outsource encryption to a
semi-trusted re-encryption server. However, if the server colludes with some
malicious user, the data secrecy will be compromised completely. Compared with this
15
scheme, the proposed PP-CP-ABE is secure even if service providers and malicious
users collude. Recently, Yu et al. [97] proposed a security framework for cloud
computing based on CP-ABE. Compared with the proposed work, their solution
requires the users to disclose part of original private key to the cloud while the
proposed solution only send blinded private keys. Moreover, the proposed solution
specially considers mobile cloud environments and their work.
Data security in public cloud is an emerging research area
[90, 99, 27, 89, 3, 35, 17, 56, 98, 40, 39, 49, 77, 54]. With the fast development of
wireless technology, mobile cloud has become an emerging cloud service model [50],
in which mobile devices and sensors are used as the information collecting and
processing nodes for the cloud infrastructure. This new trend demands researchers and
practitioners to construct a trustworthy architecture for mobile cloud computing,
which includes a large numbers of lightweight, resource-constrained mobile devices.
While data integrity and retrievability in the cloud are also important security
requirements, they are not the focuses of this dissertation. Readers can refer to
research works in the provable data possession (PDP) [3, 35].
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Chapter 3
Background Information
In this chapter, I briefly introduce some background knowledge of the proposed
systems.
3.1 Bilinear Pairing
Pairing is a bilinear map function e :G1G2 !GT , where G1, G2 and GT are three
cyclic groups with large prime order p . The G1 and G2 are additive group and GT is
multiplicative group.
The discrete Logarithm Problem on G1, G2 and GT are hard. Pairing has the
following properties:
• Bilinearity:
e([a]g; [b]h) = e(g;h)ab; 8g 2G1;h 2G2;a;b 2 Zp:
• Nondegeneracy:
e(g0;h0) 6= 1 where g0 is the generator of G1 and h0 is the generator of G2.
• Computability:
There exist an efficient algorithm to compute the pairing.
3.2 Complexity Assumption
The security of the proposed constructions is based on a complexity assumption called
the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption (BDHE) [10].
Let G0 be a bilinear group of prime order p. The K-BDHE problem in G0 is stated as
follows: given the following vector of 2K+1 elements (Note that the ga
K+1
is not in
the list):
(h;g;ga ;g(a
2);    ;gaK ;gaK+2 ;    ;ga2K) 2G2K+10
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as the input and the goal of the computational K-BDHE problem is to output
e(g;h)a
(K+1)
. One can denote the the set as:
Yg;a;K = fga ;g(a2);    ;gaK ;gaK+2 ;    ;ga2Kg:
Definition 1 (Decisional K-BDHE) The decisional K-BDHE assumption is said to be
hold in G0 if there is no probabilistic polynomial time adversary who is able to
distinguish
< h;g;Yg;a;K ;e(g;h)a
(K+1)
>
and
< h;g;Yg;a;K ;e(g;h)R >
with non-negligible advantage, where a;R 2 Zp and g;h 2G0 are chosen
independently and uniformly at random. 
3.3 Secret Sharing
(t;n) secret sharing is used to divide a secret into n shares and any t shares can
reconstruct the secret, while combining less than t shares will not disclose any
information about the secret. As introduced by Shamir at el. in [81], in a t 1 degree
polynomial, any t points on the polynomial be used to reconstruct the secret, i.e., the
polynomial. The Lagrange coefficient Di;S for i 2 Zp and a set, S, of elements in Zp is
defined as:
Di;S(x) = Õ
( j2S; j 6=i)
x  j
i  j :
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Chapter 4
Efficient Attribute Based Encryption
In this chapter, I present the construction of efficient attribute based encryption with
constant size ciphertext.
4.1 Overview
Existing CP-ABE schemes usually incur large, linearly increasing ciphertext. In the
CP-ABE schemes reported in [7, 16, 53], the size of a ciphertext increases linearly
with respect to the number of included attributes. For example, the message size in
BSW CP-ABE [7] starts at about 630 bytes, and each additional attribute adds about
250-300 bytes.
In this chapter, a novel CP-ABE construction, named Constant-size Ciphertext Policy
Attribute Based Encryption (CCP-ABE) is proposed. CCP-ABE incurs constant-size
of ciphertext, regardless of the number of attributes in a logical AND data access
policy with wildcards. Besides the encrypted message and encoded access policy,
each ciphertext only requires 2 bilinear group elements, which are bounded by 300
bytes in total. Moreover, due to the new construction of CCP-ABE, we can prove that
the CCP-ABE is CPA secure. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first few such
constructions that achieve these properties
Boneh et al. proposed a broadcast encryption construction with constant ciphertext
size in [13], where the broadcast encryptor uses the public key list corresponding to
intended receivers to perform encryption. To make the ciphertext constant, each
receiver’s public key is multiplied together, assuming a multiplicative group structure.
Thus, the result ciphertext is still an element on the group, i.e., the ciphertext is
constant size. We use a similar strategy to achieve constant ciphertext in our proposed
scheme.
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In this construction, each public key is mapped to an attribute value, including Ai. To
encrypt a message, the encryptor specify an access policyW by assigning an attribute
value (Ai 2 f1;0;g) for each of the n attributes in the Universe and encrypt the
message using public keys of the attribute values in theW . Each decryptor is
generated a set of private key components corresponding to his/her attribute list L. All
the private key components of the same user are tied together by a common random
factor to prevent collusion attacks.
4.2 System and Models
In this Section, I describe how to use attributes to form a data access policy.
LetU = fAigi2[1;k] be the Universe of attributes in the system. Each Ai has three
values: fA+i ;A i ;Ai g. When a user u joins the system, u is tagged with an attribute list
defined as follows:
Definition 2 A user’s attribute list is defined as L= fL[i]i2[1;k]g, where
L[i] 2 fA+i ;A i g and k is the number of attributes in the universe. 
Intuitively, A+i denotes the user has Ai; A
 
i denotes the user does not have Ai or Ai is
not a proper attribute of this user. For example, suppose
U = fA1 = CS;A2 = EE;A3 = Faculty;A4 = Studentg. Alice is a student in CS
department; Bob is a faculty in EE department; Carol is a faculty holding a joint
position in EE and CS department. Their attribute lists are illustrated in the following
table:
Attributes L[1] L[2] L[3] L[4]
Description CS EE Faculty Student
Alice A+1 A
 
2 A
 
3 A
+
4
Bob A 1 A
+
2 A
+
3 A
 
4
Carol A+1 A
+
2 A
+
3 A
 
4
The AND-gate access policy is defined in below:
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Definition 3 Let W = fW [i]gi2[1;k] be an AND-gate access policy, where
W [i] 2 fA+i ;A i ;Ai g. We use the notation L j=W to denote that the attribute list L of a
user satisfies W, as:
L j=W ()W  L
[
fAi gi2[1;k]:

A+i or A
 
i requires the exact same attribute in user’s attribute list. As for A

i , it denotes
a wildcard value, which means the policy does not care the value of attribute Ai.
Effectively, each user with either A+i or A
 
i fulfills A

i automatically. For example in
the Table 4.2, to specify an access policyW1 for all CS Student and an access policy
W2 for all CS people:
Table 4.1: Example of Policies in the CCP-ABE.
Attributes W [1] W [2] W [3] W [4]
Description CS EE Faculty Student
W1 A+1 A
 
2 A
 
3 A
+
4
W2 A+1 A
 
2 A

3 A

4
4.3 Constant Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption Construction
In this section, I present the construction of CCP-ABE scheme.
CCP-ABE Construction Overview
The CCP-ABE scheme consists of four fundamental algorithms:
• Setup(k)
The Setup algorithm takes input k as the number of attributes in the system. It
returns public key PK and master keyMK. The public key is used for
encryption while the master key is used for private key generation.
• KeyGen(PK;MK;L)
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The KeyGen algorithm takes the public key PK, the master key MK and the
user’s attribute list L as input . It outputs the private key of the user.
• Encrypt(PK;W;M)
The Encrypt algorithm takes the public key PK, the specified access policyW
and the messageM as input. The algorithm outputs ciphertextCT such that only
a user with attribute list satisfying the access policy can decrypt the message.
The ciphertext also associates the access policyW .
• Decrypt(PK;SK;CT)
The Decrypt algorithm decrypts the ciphertext when the user’s attribute list
satisfies the access policy specified in the ciphertext. It takes the public key PK,
the private key SK of the user and the ciphertextCT as input. It returns the
plaintextM if L j=W , where L is the user’s attribute list andW is the access
policy.
Setup
Assuming there are k attributes fA1;A2;    ;Akg in the system, we have K = 3k
attributes values since each attribute Ai has 3 values: fA+i ;A i ;Ai g. For ease of
presentation, we map fA+1 ;A+2 ;    ;A+k g to f1;    ;kg, fA 1 ;A 2 ;    ;A k g to
fk+1;    ;2kg and k wildcards fA1;A2;    ;Akgto f2k+1;    ;3kg as in the Table 4.2:
Table 4.2: Mapping attribute values to numbers.
Attributes A1 A2 A3    Ak
A+i 1 2 3    k
A i k+1 k+2 k+3    2k
Ai 2k+1 2k+2 2k+3    3k
Let G0 be the bilinear group of prime order p. Trusted Authority (TA) first picks a
random generator g 2G0 and a random a 2 Zp. It computes gi = g(a i) for
i= 1;2;    ;K;K+2;    ;2K where K = 3k. Next, TA picks a random g 2 Zp and sets
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v= gg 2G0. The public key is:
PK = (g;g1; : : : ;gK;gK+2; : : : ;g2K;v) 2G2K+10 :
The master keyMK = fg;ag is guarded by the TA.
Key Generation
Each user u is tagged with the attribute list Lu = fLu[i]i2[1;k]g when joining the system,
where 1 Lu[i] 2k. The TA first selects k random numbers frigi2[1;k] from Zp and
calculate r = åki=1 ri.
The TA computes D= ggr = vr. For 8i 2 [1;k], TA calculates
Di = gg(a
Lu[i]+ri) = ggLu[i] ggri and Fi = gg(a
2k+i+ri) = gg2k+i ggri .
The private key for user u is computed as:
SKu = (D; fDigi2[1;k];fFigi2[1;k]):
Encryption
The encrypter picks a random t in Zp and sets the one-time symmetric encryption key
Key= e(gK;g1)kt . Suppose AND-gate policy isW with k attributes. Each attribute is
either positive/negative or wildcards.
The encryptor first encrypts the message using symmetric key Key as fMgKey. The
encryptor also sets C0 = gt . Then, it calculates C1 = (vÕ j2W gK+1  j)t . Finally, the
ciphertext is:
CT = (W;fMgKey;gt ;(vÕ
j2W
gK+1  j)t)
= (W;fMgKey;Hdr)
where the ciphertext header Hdr = fC0;C1g.
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Decryption
For 8i 2 [1;k], u calculates the T0 and T1 as follows.
T0 = e(gW [i];C1)
= e(ga
W [i]
;gt(g+å j2W a
K+1  j))
= e(g;g)tga
W [i]+tå j2W aK+1  j+W [i]
And ifW [i] 2 Lu, u computes:
T1 = e(D[i]  Õ
j2W; j 6=W [i]
gK+1  j+W [i];C0)
= e(gt ;gg(a
W [i]+ri)+å j2W; j 6=W [i]aK+1  j+W [i])
= e(g;g)tg(a
W [i]+ri)+tå j2W; j 6=W [i]aK+1  j+W [i]:
Else, ifW [i] 2 fAi gi2[1;k], u computes:
T1 = e(F [i]  Õ
j2W; j 6=W [i]
gK+1  j+W [i];C0)
= e(gt ;gg(a
W [i]+ri)+å j2W; j 6=W [i]aK+1  j+W [i])
= e(g;g)tg(a
W [i]+ri)+tå j2W; j 6=W [i]aK+1  j+W [i]:
Then, we calculate
T0=T1 = e(g;g) tgri+ta
K+1
:
After u calculate all k terms, we make a production of all the quotient terms and get:
e(g;g) tg(r1+r2++rk)+kta
k+1
= e(g;g) tgr+kta
K+1
:
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u calculates:
e(D;C0) = e(g;g)tgr:
Then, u produces these two terms and get Key= e(g;g)kta
K+1
= e(gK;g1)kt and
decrypt the message.
4.4 Security Analysis
I reduced Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) security of the proposed scheme to
decisional K-BDHE assumption. I first define the decryption proxy to model collusion
attackers.
Security Game for CCP-ABE
A CP-ABE scheme is considered to be secure against chosen CPA if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries have non-negligible advantages in this game.
Init: The adversary choose the challenge access policyW and give it to challenger.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives adversary the PK.
Phase 1: The adversary submits L for a KeyGen query, where L 2W . The challenger
answers with a secret key SK for L. This can be repeated adaptively
Challenge: The challenger runs Encrypt algorithm to obtain f<C0;C1 >;Keyg. Next,
the challenger picks a random b 2 f0;1g. It sets Key0 = Key and picks a random Key1
with same length to Key0 in G1. It then gives f<C0;C1 >;Keybg to the adversary.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess b0 2 f0;1g and it wins the game if b0 = b.
Note that the adversary may make multiple secret key queries both before and after the
challenge, which result in the collusion resistance in the proposed scheme. I also point
out this CPA security game is called as selective ID security, because the adversary
must submit a challenge access structure before the setup phase.
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Theorem 1 If a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary wins the CPA game with
non-negligible advantage, then we can construct a simulator that distinguish a
K-DBHE tuple with non-negligible advantage. 
Security Proof
I reduce CPA security of the proposed scheme to decisional K-BDHE assumption. I
first define the decryption proxy to model collusion attackers.
Definition 4 (Decryption Proxy) In order to model the collusion attacks, I define 2k
decrypting proxies in the security game. Each decrypting proxy pi(r) = gg(a
i+r),
where r 2 Zp and i 2 f1;    ;2kg, i.e., a private key component corresponding to a
particular attribute value.
In collusion attacks against access policyW , a user with attribute list L 3W collude
with x k decryption proxies to attack the ciphertext. We call the colluding with x
decryption proxy as x-collusion. Intuitively, x-collusion means the attacker needs x
attributes values, say fi1; i2;    ; ixg to add to his attribute list L such that
L[fi1; i2;    ; ixg j=W . Note that 0-collusion means no decryption proxy is used and
user does not collude.
Proof of Theorem 6 :
Suppose that an adversary A wins the selective game for CCP-ABE with the
advantage e . Then, we can construct a SimulatorB that breaks decisional K-BDHE
assumption with the advantage
maxfe=2;(1 q=p)le=2;(1  (1  (1 q=p)l)m)e=2g= e=2. The simulatorB takes
an input a random decisional K-BDHE challenge
< h;g;Yg;a;K ;Z >;
where Z is either e(g;h)a
(K+1)
or a random element on G0. B now plays the role of
challenger in the pre-defined CPA game:
26
Init: A sends toB the access policyW that A wants to be challenged.
Setup: B runs the Setup algorithm to generate PK. B chooses random d 2 Zp and
generates:
v= gd(Õ
j2W
gK+1  j) 1 = gd å j2W a
K+1  j
= gg :
TheB outputs the PK as:
PK = (g;Yg;a;K ;v) 2G2K+10 :
Phase 1: The adversary A submits an attribute list L for a private key query, where
L 2W . There must exist a j in L such that: either j 2 f1;    ;kg and j+ k 2W or
j 2 fk+1;    ;2kg and j  k 2W .
The simulatorB first selects k random numbers ri 2 Zp for i= 1 : : :k and set
r = r1+   + rk. Then,B generates
D= (gd Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) 1)r
= g(d å j2W a
K+1  j)r
= ggr:
Then, for all i 2 L+ and i+ k 2W : B generates:
Di = gdi Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j+i) 1guri0 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) ri0 ;
where i0 = i.
For all i 2 L  and i  k 2W : B generates:
Di = gdi Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j+i) 1guri0 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) ri0 ;
where i0 = i  k.
For all i 2 L and i =2W : B generates:
Fi = gdi Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j+i) 1guri0 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) ri0 ;
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where i0 = i 2k.
Note that each for each Di or Fi is valid since:
Di = (gd(Õ
j2W
gK+1  j) 1)(a
i+ri0) = gg(a
i+ri0);
and
Fi = (gd(Õ
j2W
gK+1  j) 1)(a
i+ri0) = gg(a
i+ri0):
Challenge: The simulatorB sets <C0;C1 > as < h;hd >. It then gives the challenge
f<C0;C1 >;Zkg to A .
To see the validity of challenge, C0 = h= gt for some unknown t. Then:
hd = (gd)t
= (gd Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) 1 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j))t
= (vÕ
j2W
(gK+1  j))t ;
and if Z = e(g;h)a
(K+1)
, then Zk = Key.
Phase 2: Repeat as Phase 1.
Guess: The adversary A output a guess b0 of b. When b0 = 0, A guesses that
Z = e(g;h)a
(K+1)
. When b0 = 1, A guesses Z is a random element.
If Z is a random element, then the Pr[B(h;g;Yg;a;K ;Z) = 0] = 12 .
Before considering the case when Z == e(g;h)a
(K+1)
, we explain how we use
decryption proxy in the proof. Each decryption proxy pi(r) simulates a legal private
key component embedded with random number r. When calling pi(r), A passes a
random r as a guess of the ri0 , which is the random number embedded in the Di or Fi,
where i 2W . As a matter of fact, the procedure of calling decryption proxy mimics
the collusion of multiple users, who combine their private key components.
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Lemma 1 (probability of collision with 1 decryption proxy) Suppose the A has
issued q private queries and there is only 1 attribute i =2W, A queries pi(r) l times.
The possibility that the none of the queries returns a legal private key component of
any q is (1 q=p)l . 
Proof 1 The possibility that the one query does not return a legal private key
component of any q is 1 q=p. Thus, if none of the l query succeed, the probability
Pr[r 6= ri0 ] = (1 q=p)l , where r is the random number in decryption proxy, ri0 is the
random number embedded in the private key, q is the number of private key queries in
phase 1 and phase 2, l is the number of calling decryption proxy with different r, and
p is the order of Zp. 
Lemma 2 (probability of collision with m decryption proxy) Suppose the A has
issued q private queries and there is m attributes violate the W, A queries each of the
m decryption proxy pi1(r1); pi2(r2);    ; pim(rm) l times. The possibility that the none
of the queries returns a legal private key component of any q is (1  (1 q=p)l)m. 
Proof 2 The probability that 1 decryption proxy fails is Pr[r 6= ri0] = (1 q=p)l . The
probability that all the m decryption proxy successfully return legal components is
(1  (1  (q=p)l))m. In the case of not all m succeed, the probability is
Pr[ri j 6= ri0j ;9 j  m] = 1  (1  (1 q=p)l)m. 
If Z == e(g;h)a
(K+1)
, we consider the following cases:
• 0-Collusion: If no decryption proxy is used, A has at least e=2 advantage in
breaking the proposed scheme, thenB has at least e advantage in breaking
K-BDHE, i.e.,
jPr[B(h;g;Yg;a;K ;Z) = 0]  12 j  e=2:
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• 1-collusion If 1 decryption proxy, say pi(r) is used, Pr[r 6= ri0] = (1 q=p)l ,
where r is the random number in decryption proxy, ri0 is the random number
embedded in the private key, q is the number of private key queries in phase 1
and phase 2, l is the number of calling decryption proxy with different r, and p
is the order of Zp. Note that if r = ri0 , A can use pi(r) as a valid private key
component to compromise the ciphertext.
If the A has at least e advantage in breaking the proposed scheme, thenB has
at least (1 q=p)le=2 advantage in breaking K-BDHE.
• m-collusion If m decryption proxies, say
pi1(r1); pi2(r2);    ; pim(rm)
are used. The possibility that Pr[ri j 6= ri0j ;9 j  m] = (1  (1  (q=p)l))m, where
rm is the random number in m decryption proxy pim(rim) for the private key
component im, ri0m is the random number generated for the A , q is the number of
private key queries in phase 1 or phase 2, l is the number of calling m decryption
proxies with different r’s, p is the order of Zp.
If the A has at least e advantage in breaking the proposed scheme, thenB has
at least (1  (1  (1 q=p)l)m)e=2 advantage in breaking K-BDHE.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Group Communication based on ABE
In this chapter, I present the proposed optimal group communication constructed
based on the proposed constant size attribute based encryption.
To secure the one-to-many multicast groups with membership changes, I proposed an
Optimal Group Key (OGK) scheme that achieves the optimal balance between storage
and communication overhead. A new optimality concept, named
storage-communication-optimality, is defined by considering both storage overhead
and communication overhead. The storage-communication-optimality condition
ensures that removing multiple members requires minimal number of multicasted
messages. OGK is the first work that achieves storage-communication-optimality
without colluding vulnerabilities. It out-performs all existing tree-based group key
management schemes in terms of communication efficiency.
While the OGK can be used to secure one-to-many data distribution from centralized
sources, broadcast encryption schemes support many-to-many communication model,
where any data senders are able to communicate any receivers. In this dissertation, the
Broadcast Encryption is generalized to Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption
(ABBE). In existing Broadcast Encryption, the encryptor must explicitly specify a list
of intended decryptors and encrypt the message using public keys of all decryptors.
However, in many scenarios, it is natural that the encryptor does not have the complete
list of decryptors on hand when encrypting the data. Moreover, in large scale system,
storing every user’s public key is expensive and infeasible. In ABBE, encryptor does
not need to explicitly specify the list of decryptors and the number of stored public
keys is small (O(logN)) when the number of users (N)is large.
The OGK scheme is presented in Section 5.1 and the ABBE scheme is presented in
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Section 5.2.
5.1 Optimal Group Key Management
Overview
In OGK, a group controller (GC) is responsible for key generation and distribution
and the group data are encrypted by a GK. When joining the group, each group
member (GM) is assigned a unique n-bit ID and a set of secrets, in which each bit is
one-to-one mapped to a unique secret. We must note that different GMs may share
common bits in their IDs, however the corresponding secrets are different and they are
masked by using distinct random numbers. Thus, different GMs cannot collude by
combining their secrets that are masked by different random numbers. We denote the
set of pre-distributed secrets as the GM’s private key.
Whenever GMs are revoked from the group, GC will multicast an encrypted
key-update message. Only the remaining GMs are able to recover the message and
update GK as well as their private keys. To achieve
storage-communication-optimality, we use tree-based construction based on Flat Table
[23] approach. In order to minimize the number of encrypted key-update messages,
we use a minimized boolean function in the form of sum-of-product-expression
(SOPE) that is calculated based on the IDs of remaining GMs. Each remaining GM
can combine n pre-distributed secrets in his/her private key to decrypt the updated GK.
OGK is the first work that achieves storage-communication optimality with constant
message size and immune to collusion attack. It outperforms existing group key
management schemes in terms of communication and storage efficiency. We must
note that in [25], the authors utilized the ciphertext policy attributed based encryption
(CP-ABE [7]) scheme to implement FT so that it is secure against collusion attack.
Although their solution is similar to OGK, we adopt a different approach to
significantly improve the communication efficiency in comparison with using
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CP-ABE directly. As mentioned in [25], the size of each key update message is large,
in which the message grows linearly based on the number of attributes [25, 7]. In
OGK, each message is substantially reduced to a constant size.
Based on the storage-communication optimality, OGK also supports dynamic
subgroup communication efficiently. OGK allows each GM to initialize a secure
subgroup communication with any subset of GMs in a many-to-many communication
fashion. Moreover, the number of required messages for subgroup setup is minimized.
To the best of our knowledge, OGK is first such construction that achieves all of
following properties:
• Given any number of revoked GMs, the number of encrypted key-update
messages is information theoretically minimized to  O(logN).
• The size of each encrypted key-update message is constant.
• The communication overhead of GM addition is O(1), i.e., only single multicast
message is required.
• The storage overhead of GC and GM is O(logN) if GC does not store IDs of
GMs.
• OGK is collusion resistant and provides forward and backward group key
secrecy.
• OGK supports dynamic subgroup communication efficiently.
Storage-communication-optimal condition
In this section, we briefly introduce the storage-communication-optimality condition.
First, we define the Encrypted Stream as encrypted messages decipherable by one or a
combination of secrets. For example, in nested encryption [33], the ciphertext
EK1(EK2(M)) can be decrypted only by the combination of both fK1;K2g.
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To facilitate the rekeying operations, a set of auxiliary keys need to be preinstalled for
each group member. One naı¨ve way is to set a unique long term key for each group
member as advocated in [46] and [47]. To revoke a set of group members L, jGnLj
messages are required to distribute a new GK. Thus, the communication cost is O(N).
In this example, each member can decrypt exact 1 encrypted stream and the storage
cost for group members is O(1).
We can reduce the communication cost by increasing the number of encrypted streams
each member can decrypt. As there are 2N subsets of group members in the multicast
group of size N, group members in the same subset are distributed a unique subset
key. Hence, every group member stores 2N 1 subset keys and can decrypt 2N 1
encrypted streams. When revoking group members L, the group controller only needs
to multicast one message, i.e., a new GK is encrypted by the subset key of GnL, since
each group member in GnL already stores a subset key for GnL. In this example, the
communication overhead is O(1); while the storage overhead is O(2N). As one can
see from this extreme case, each group member can decrypt 2N 1 encrypted streams.
However, O(2N) storage overhead makes this solution infeasible and the optimal
balance between storage and communication overhead is required.
Intuitively, as shown in the previous two extreme cases, the more encrypted streams
each member can decrypt, the less communication overhead (in terms of number of
rekeying messages) is required. In [74], the authors proved that, for any tree-based
group key management scheme, the optimal storage overhead for a given N group
members is O(logN). The storage-communication-optimality condition describes the
optimally balanced condition between the storage and communication overhead.
When achieving storage-communication optimality, each group member can use their
logN preinstalled keys to decrypt 2logN 1= N 1 encrypted streams using different
subgroup keys. So far as we know, none of the secure tree-based group key
management schemes achieves the storage-communication optimality.
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Non-colluding requirement
Flat Table (FT) scheme [23] (illustrated in Figure 2.2) is the only solution that
achieves the storage-communication optimality with O(logN) storage overhead.
However, FT scheme is vulnerable to collusion attacks, in which multiple revoked
members combine their preinstalled secrets to compromise the new GK. In this paper,
we present a scheme that is storage-communication-optimal and immune to collusion
attacks.
ID and Bit-Assignment
Each group member (GM) is associated with a unique binary ID: b0b1 : : :bn 2bn 1,
where n= logN and N is the size of the group. The ID is issued by the GC when a
GM joins the group. Once the GM left the group, his/her ID can be re-assigned to
other joining GMs.
We can use a logic literal, which is called bit-assignment, Bi or Bi to indicate the
binary value at position i in a particular ID. Bi indicates the bi = 1; Bi indicates the
bi = 0. For a group with N GMs, the length of an ID is n= logN and the total number
of bit-assignments is 2n; that is, two binary values are mapped to one bit position. We
call the set of all possible bit-assignments to be Universe U , which contains 2n
bit-assignments.
A GM u is uniquely identified by the set of bit-assignments Su associated with u’s ID.
Also, multiple GMs may have a common subset of bit-assignments. For example, in
Figure 5.1, a GM u1’s ID is 000 and a GM u2’s ID is 001, Su1 = fB0;B1;B2g and
Su2 = fB0;B1;B2g and Su1
T
Su2 = fB0;B1g.
In OGK, the GMs can be organized as leafs in a binary tree with each non-root node
marked with a bit-assignment (Figure 5.1). Note that there are only 2n distinct
35
non-root nodes in the tree and each level contains 2 distinct nodes. This is
fundamentally different from existing tree-based schemes in [84, 93, 71], where there
are 2d distinct nodes at level d. The ID of a GM can be represented by the
bit-assignment nodes from the root down to the leaf. Thus, any two GMs will have at
least one different bit-assignment.
Figure 5.1: An illustration of bit-assignments for a 3-bit ID space.
Group Setup
In this section, I describe how the GC setups the multicast group. First, GC chooses
bilinear map over group G1, G2 and GT of prime order p. Assume the generator of G1
is g and generator of G2 is h. Also, GC chooses a publicly known one-way function
H. Then, it chooses two non-trivial random numbers a;b 2 Zp. For simplicity, we
can map the universe of bit-assignmentsU to the first jU j members of Zp, i.e., the
integers f1;2; : : : ; jU jg. For each bit-assignment B 2U , GC chooses a non-trivial
random number yB 2 Zp. We denote this set of 2n random numbers as
YB = fyB0 ;yB0; : : : ;yBn 1;yBn 1g
For each yB 2 YB, GC also generates the tuple < e(g;h)ayB ;gbyB >. We denote the set
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of 2n tuples as:
EB = f< e(g;h)ayB ;gbyB > j8yB 2 YBg
GC publishes the group public parameter:
GP= fe;g 2G1;h 2G2;H;EBg:
On the other hand, GC protects the group master key:
MK = fa;b ;YBg:
GM Joining and Key Generation
When a new GM u joins the group, u needs to setup a secure channel with the GC
using either a pre-shared key or public key certificates. GC then checks whether the
GM is authorized to join. Once the checking is passed, GC assigns a unique ID
bun 1b
u
n 2:::b
u
0 and a set of bit assignments Su to u.
Once u is admitted to the group, GC runs key generation algorithm KeyGen(MK;Su)
(Algorithm 1) to generate private key SKu for u, whereMK is the group master key
and Su is the set of bit-assignments in u’ ID. The algorithm first chooses a non-trivial
random number r 2 Zp. Then, it computes h
a+r
b 2G2. Finally, for each bit-assignment
B 2 Su, the KeyGen algorithm calculates a blinded secret share hryB 2G2. The
outputted private key
SKu : fD= h
a+r
b ;8B 2 Su : DB = hryBg
If u is the first GM in the group, GC will generate an initial GK and sends the private
key fSKu;GKg to the new GM u through a secure channel. If u is not the first joining
GM, to preserve backward secrecy, GC generates another random key GK0 and
multicast fGK0gGK . Each GM other than u can decrypt the message and replace GK
with GK0. Finally, GC sends fSKu;GK0g to the new GM u through a secure unicast
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Algorithm 1 KeyGen(MK;Su)
Randomly select r 2 Zp;
Compute h
a+r
b ;
for each B 2 Su do
Compute hryB ;
end for
return
SKu : fD= h
a+r
b ;8B 2 Su : DB = hryBg;
channel. In the join process, besides the unicast communication, GC only needs to
multicast one message, i.e., fGK0gGK . Thus, the communication overhead for GMs
join is O(1).
One important observation is that GC does not need to store the ID or private keys of
any GMs. Thus, the storage overhead of GC can be significantly reduced to O(logN),
since GC is only required to store the system parameters and master key.
Encryption and Decryption
As we have mentioned, OGK allows GC and GMs to securely communicate with any
subset of GMs. Whenever, GMs are revoked from the group, GC needs to multicast a
key update message to all remaining GMs, who will update their GK as well as private
keys. On the other hand, GMs can initialize a secure subgroup communications with
any subset of GMs.
In this section, I present how a GC or GM can encrypt a message with a set of
bit-assignment S, so that only GMs whose IDs satisfy S can decrypt the message. For
example, in a three-bit-ID group, if a ciphertext is encrypted by using bit-assignment
S= fB0;B1g, GMs with IDs 010 and 011 can decrypt the ciphertext.
Encryption
Encrypt(GP;S;M) encryption algorithm takes inputs of the group parameter GP, a set
of bit-assignment S, the message M, and returns the ciphertextCT . Given the set of
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bit-assignment S, it is easy to calculate the following terms:
e(g;h)aYS = e(g;h)aåB2S yB
=Õ
B2S
e(g;h)ayB
gbYS = gb åB2S yB
=Õ
B2S
gbyB
For example, if S= fB0;B1;B2g, e(g;h)aYS = e(g;h)a(yB0+yB1+yB2).
After calculating e(g;h)aYS and gbYS , the Encrypt algorithm 2 generates a non-trivial
random number t 2 Zp. Then, the algorithm computes C0 =M e(g;h)atYS ,
C1 = gb tYS ,C2 = gt , where  is bitwise XOR operation. Thus, the ciphertext is as:
CT : fS;C0 =M e(g;h)atYS ;C1 = gb tYS ;C2 = gtg
Algorithm 2 Encrypt(MK;S;M)
Compute e(g;h)aYS =ÕB2S e(g;h)ayB ;
Compute gbYS =ÕB2S gbyB ;
Randomly select t 2 Zp;
ComputeC0 =M e(g;h)atYS ;
ComputeC1 = gb tYS ;
ComputeC2 = gt ;
return
CT : fS;C0 =M e(g;h)atYS ;C1 = gb tYS ;C2 = gtg;
Decryption
On receiving the CT, those GMs who satisfy the bit-assignment CT:S can decrypt the
CT by performing decryption algorithm Decrypt(GP;SK;CT ).
The Decrypt algorithm 3 first checks whether the GM u is eligible to decrypt the
message by testing whether CT:S Su, where CT:S represents the bit assignments
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Algorithm 3 Decrypt(GP;SK;CT )
if CT:S* Su then
return ?;
end if
Compute F =ÕB2CT:S hryB = grYCT:S ;
Compute A1 = e(C1;D) = e(g;h)(a+r)tYCT:S
Compute A2 = e(C2;F) = e(g;h)rtYCT:S
Compute A1=A2 = A3 = e(g;h)atYCT:S
ComputeC0A3 =M
return M;
associated with the ciphertext CT . Then, for each bit assignment B 2CT:S, the
algorithm use u’s pre-distributed secret shares DB = hryB to compute:
F = Õ
B2CT:S
DB
= Õ
B2CT:S
hryB
= hråB2CT:S yB
= hrYCT:S
Next, the algorithm computes:
A1 = e(C1;D)
= e(g;h)(a+r)tYCT:S
and
A2 = e(C2;F)
= e(g;h)rtYCT:S
Then the algorithm divides A1 by A2 and gets:
A3 = A1=A2
= e(g;h)atYCT:S
which blinds the plaintext in ciphertext. Finally, the algorithm unblinds the ciphertext
by calculating C0A3 =M.
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Encryption for Subgroups of GMs
In this subsection, I present how GC or GMs can securely communicate with arbitrary
subgroup of members optimally. I first define some of the terms used in the following
presentations:
• Literal: A variable or its complement, e.g., B1, B1, etc.
• Product Term: Literals connected by AND gate, e.g., B2B1B0.
• Sum-of-Product Expression (SOPE): Product terms connected by OR, e.g.,
B2B1B0+B2.
Given a subgroup of GMs L, a boolean membership function ML(B0;B1; : : : ; Bn 2;
Bn 1), which is in the form of SOPE, is used to determine the membership of this
subgroup. Formally, the following properties of membership functions hold:
ML(bu0;b
u
1; : : : ;b
u
n 2;b
u
n 1) =
8><>: 0 iff u 2 GnL;1 iff u 2 L:
For example, if the subgroup L= f000;001;011;111g, then
M = B0B1B2+B0B1B2+B0B1B2+B0B1B2.
The GC or a GM runs the Quine-McCluskey algorithm [62] to reduce ML to minimal
SOPE MminL . The reduction can consider do not care values on those IDs that are not
currently assigned to any GM to further reduce the size of MminL . Since M
min
L is in the
form of SOPE, encryption is performed on each product term. That is, for each
product term E in MminL , Encrypt algorithm encrypts the message with the set of
bit-assignment S that contains all literals in E. The total number of encrypted message
equals to the number of product terms in Mmin.
For example, if L= f000;001;011;111g, MminL = B0B1+B1B2. We can find that MminL
contains 2 product terms. the message M for the subgroup L can be encrypted as
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MfB0;B1g andMfB1;B2g respectively.
GM Leaving
Key Update
When several GMs (denoted by set L) are revoked from the group, GC needs to update
the fMK;GP;GKg as well as the private key of each remaining GM u 2 GnL. I
present how this process can be done efficiently.
GC first changes MK to MK0 = fa 0;b ;YBg, where a 0 is randomly selected in Zp.
Also, group public parameter GP is updated accordingly. Then, GC multicasts an
encrypted key-update factor ku f = h
a 0 a
b . Note that ku f is encrypted, and it cannot be
decrypted by any u 2 L.
Each GM u 2 GnL updates the component D in its private key SKu using the
ku f = g
a0 a
b . The new D can be updated by the following method:
D ha
0 a
b = h
a+r
b ha
0 a
b = h
a+r+a 0 a
b = h
a 0+r
b . Also, each u 2 GnL updates their GK
simply by computing GK0 = H(h
a 0 a
b ).
Single or Multiple Leave
We first consider that only one GM leaves the group. For example, if the leaving GM
u’s ID is 101 with bit-assignment Su = fB0;B1;B2g. The key updating message is
encrypted as fku fgfB0g, fku fgfB1g, fku fgfB2g and is multicasted to the entire group.
If ID 100 is not assigned, fku fgfB2g is not needed. Although the leaving member may
intercept the transmitted messages, it cannot decrypt them since every message is
encrypted with a bit assignment that the leaving member does not possess. On the
other hand, each of remaining GMs can decrypt at least one of the multicasted
messages.
We now focus on the case when multiple GMs leave the multicast group. Given the set
of leaving GMs L, GC can easily derive the set of remaining GMs, i.e. GnL, as well
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as the set of unassigned IDs if GC stores all assigned IDs. If GC does not store
assigned ID, GC can assume all IDs are assigned. Then, the GC runs the
Quine-McCluskey algorithm [62] to reduce the membership functionMGnL to minimal
SOPE. Then, GC can encrypt the key updating factor for each product term. The total
number of encrypted key updating factors equals to the number of product terms in
Mmin. For example, we assume that two GMs f000;010g leave, five GMS
f001;011;100;101;110g remain, and f111g is not assigned to any GM (i.e., the ID bit
assignments are do not care). With the considerations do not care values,M can be
reduced to MminGnL = B0+B2. GC need to multicast two messages fku fgfB0g and
fku fgfB2g.
Information Theoretical Storage-Communication-Optimality
In this section, I investigate the optimality of OGK through an information theoretical
approach similar to the models in [74]. In Section 5.2, I first proved that O(logN)
attains information theoretical lower bound of storage requirements. Nextly, in
Section 5.1, I defined the Storage-Communication-Optimality condition.
Optimal Storage
To be uniquely identified, each user’s ID should not be prefix of any other user’s, i.e.
the bit-assignments should be prefix-free. For example, suppose a user u0 is issued an
ID 00, which is prefix of u1 with ID 000 and u2 with ID 001. When an encryptor tries
to reach u1 and u2, the minimized membership function is M = B0B1, which is also
satisfied by u0. Similarly, it is also imperative that a user’s bit-assignments should not
be a subset of any other user’s.
Theorem 2 If we denote the number of bit-assignments (or number of bits in the ID)
for a user ui by li. For an multicast communication group with N users and the IDs of
users satisfy the prefix-free condition, the set fl1; l2; : : : ; lNg satisfies the Kraft
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inequality:
N
å
i=1
2 li  1:

Proof 3 The proof is available in [29]. 
The prefix free condition is necessary and sufficient condition for addressing any user
with their bit-assignments.
Assuming li bit-assignments are required to identify ui and the probability to send a
message to ui is pi, we can model the storage overhead as:
N
å
i=1
pili: (5.1)
Intuitively, this formation argues that the storage overhead from a sender’s perspective
is the average number of bit-assignments required to address to any particular receiver.
Thus, an optimization problem is formulated to minimize the storage overhead for a
broadcast encryption system:
min
li
N
å
i=1
pili
s.t.
N
å
i=1
2 li  1:
This problem can be further rewritten as a Lagrangian optimization problem as:
min
li
f
N
å
i=1
pili+l (
N
å
i=1
d li 1)g; (5.2)
where l is the Lagrangian multiplier. The optimization problem is identical to the
optimal codeword-length selection problem [29] in information theory. Before giving
the solution to this optimization problem, we define the entropy of targeting one user
in the proposed system:
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Definition 5 The entropy H of targeting a user is
H = 
N
å
i=1
pi log pi:

Theorem 3 For a system of N users with prefix free distribution of bit-assignments,
the optimal (i.e., minimal) average number of storage overhead required for a sender
to address a receiver, written as åNi=1 pili can be given by the binary entropy
H = 
N
å
i=1
pi log pi:

Proof 4 The theorem is equivalent to to optimal codeword-length selection problem
and proof is available in [29]. 
Since the average number of bit-assignments required for addressing one particular
receiver is given by the entropy of targeting a user, we now try to derive the upper and
lower bounds of the entropy:
max
pi
 
N
å
i=i
pi log pi
and
min
pi
 
N
å
i=i
pi log pi
s.t.
N
å
i=1
pi = 1:
The upper bound Hmax = åNi=1 1N logN = logN is yielded when pi = 1=N,
8i 2 f1;2; : : : ;Ng, when each user has equal possibility to be addressed as the receiver.
When there is no apriori information about the probability distribution of targeting one
of the users, l = Hmax = logdN correspond to the optimal strategy to minimize the
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average number of storage overhead required for each user. On the other hand, the
lower bound Hmin = 0 is achieved when pi = 1 for 9i 2 f1;2; : : : ;Ng, which is an
extreme case where there is no randomness and only one user is reachable.
Storage-Communication-Optimality
Proved that O(logN) is the optimal storage strategy, we are now moving to the
optimal condition considering both storage and communication. To better illustrate
storage-communication-optimality, I present a simple example of existing solutions.
The rooted-tree structure (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2) is constructed such that each
group member is assigned as a leaf node in the tree.
Non-Flat-Table key distribution tree is shown in Figure 2.1. Three auxiliary non-root
keys are assigned to group member u2: K11, K21, and K32. Note that combining
multiple keys does not create new encrypted streams as members holds K21 is proper
subset of members holds K11 and members holds K32 is proper subset of members
holds K21. Using these auxiliary keys, u2 can decrypt 3 distinct encrypted streams:
Encrypted Streams Accessible Members
K11 fu1;u2;u3;u4g
K21 fu1;u2g
K32 fu2g
As for Flat-Table case in Figure 2.2, 3 non-root keys are distributed to the group
member u2: K11, K21, and K32. Using these auxiliary keys, u2 can decrypt in 7
encrypted streams:
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Encrypted Streams Accessible Members
K11 fu1;u2;u3;u4g
K21 fu1;u2;u5;u6g
K32 fu2;u4;u6;u8g
K11 and K21 fu1;u2g
K11 and K32 fu2;u4g
K21 and K32 fu2;u6g
K11 and K21 and K32 fu2g
Note that u2 needs to combine (such as using XOR or nested encryption) the auxiliary
keys to secure the subgroup communications. Since I have proved that logN is the
optimal storage overhead, it is straightforward to derive that the maximal number of
encrypted streams is 2logN 1= N 1. The authors in [74] showed that the
assignment of O(logN) secrets per group member is the best strategy for group
communication schemes. Thus, we can further claim that, given the logN
pre-distributed secrets, the optimality is attained only if the number of encrypted
streams each group member can participate is maximized.
Formally, the Storage-Communication-Optimality is defined as follows:
Definition 6 Storage-communication-optimality condition: for a group of N
members, each group member can combine any of the pre-distributed logN secrets to
decrypt 2logN 1= N 1 distinct encrypted streams.
As defined in Definition 6, in a Storage-Communication-Optimal scheme, each of the
2logN 1 combinations should entails a distinct subgroup or encrypted streams.
Intuitively, the more encrypted streams each member can decrypt, the less
communication overhead, in terms of number of messages, is required for the rekey
operations. With maximized encrypted streams, the encryptor can communicate with
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an arbitrary subgroup of GMs with minimized messages.
Implementation of OGK Toolkit
In this section, I discuss the practical issues in implementing OGK, including choice
of parameters, optimization methods on further reducing ciphertext size. The OGK
toolkit is implemented as a set of tools and a core library, which has been made
available on the web under the GPL (Available for download at
http://www.public.asu.edu/~zzhou17/.) OGK implementation uses the Pairing
Based Cryptography (PBC) library. The theoretical and experimental performance
assessment will be given in Section 7.8.
Parameters
OGK is implemented over two parameter sets, each of which is specially optimized
for different purposes. The Type A curve [61] is a on supersingular curve
y2 = x3+ x over 512-bit finite field, which defines a160-bit elliptic curve group and
features fastest pairing computation. On the other hand, the Type D curve [61] is
chosen using MNT method [66] and has shortest group elements. Note that each
element can be compressed to reduce size. In the actual implementation and
performance evaluation 7.8, I adopted the compressed Type D element to minimize
storage and communication overhead. The benchmark was performed on a modern
workstation which has a 3.0GHz Pentium 4 cpu with 2MB cache and 1.5 GB memory
and runs Linux 2.6.32 kernel. In the Table 5.1, I compared the Type A and Type D
parameters.
Further Reducing Ciphertext Size
If we further investigate into the ciphertext, I can reduce the total multicast data size
by combining common C2 components for different product terms in the same
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Table 5.1: Benchmark Comparison Between Type A and Type D Curves.
Type A Type D
Base Field Size(bits) 512 159
Embedded Degree(k) 2 6
DLP Security(bits) 1024 954
Pairing (ms) 6:4 15:4
G1 Element Size(bytes) 65 21
G2 Element Size(bytes) 65 61
GT Element Size(bytes) 128 120
Exp G1(ms) 7:2 3:6
Exp G2(ms) 7:3 21:1
Random G1(ms) 8:4 3:5
Random G2(ms) 8:5 20:9
Random GT (ms) 3:0 8:0
membership function. For example, if L= f000;001;011;111g,MminL = B0B1+B1B2.
We can find thatMminL contains 2 product terms. the messageM for L can be encrypted
as MfB0;B1g andMfB1;B2g. As presented in Section 5.1, the 2 encrypted messages are
constructed as
fS1 = fB0;B1g;C0 =Me(g;h)atYS1 ;C1 = gb tYS1 ;C2 = gtg
and
fS2 = fB1;B2g;C0 =Me(g;h)atYS2 ;C1 = gb tYS2 ;C2 = gtg
Note that the C2 component in the these 2 messages are identical for the same random
t.
Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of OGK scheme and compare it with
several related solutions: Flat Table scheme (FT) [23], FT implemented using
CP-ABE (FT-ABE) [25], Subset-Diff broadcast encryption scheme [37], BGW
broadcasting encryption [14], and Non-Flat-Table tree-based schemes (e.g., OFT [84],
LKH [93], ELK [71], etc.). The performance is assessed in terms of communication
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Table 5.2: Comparison of Communication Overhead in Different Group Key Manage-
ment Schemes.
Scheme Communication Overhead
join single leave multiple leaves
OGK O(1) O(logN) t O(logN)
Flat-Table O(logN) O(logN) t O(logN)
Flat-Table-ABE O(1) O(logN) t O(log2N)
Subset-Diff N/A O(t  log2(t)  logm) O(t  log2(t)  logN)
BGW N/A O(N
1
2 ) O(N
1
2 )
Non-Flat-Table-Tree O(1) O(logN) O(l  logN)
N: the number of group members; l: the number of leaving members;
t: maximum number of colluding users to compromise the ciphertext.
overhead (number and size of messages incurred by join and leave operations),
storage overhead (group data stored on the GC and GM), and computation overhead
(number of cryptographic operations needed in encryption and decryption operations).
We denote the group size be N, the number of leaving GMs to be l. Also, for the
Subset-Diff scheme, t denotes the maximum number of colluding users to compromise
the ciphertext. The summary of comparative results is presented in Table 5.2.
Communication Overhead
As a comprehensive comparison, I first discuss the communication overhead of
several broadcasting encryption schemes. In Subset-Diff scheme, the communication
overhead grows linearly with the maximum number of colluding users to compromise
the ciphertext. For BGW scheme, there are two constructions. In the first construction,
the total message size is O(1) while the storage overhead is O(N); in the second
construction, the message size is O(N
1
2 ) as reported in [14].
For tree-based multicast key distribution schemes such as OFT [84], LKH [93], ELK
[71], etc., the communication overhead for a GM leaving depends on the number of
keys in the tree that need to be updated [87, 71]. Some tree-based schemes tried to
optimize the number of messages to update all the affected keys in the case of multiple
leaves. In ELK [71], which is known to be one of the most efficient tree-based
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schemes, the communication overhead for multiple leaves is O(a  l), where a is the
number of affected keys and l is the number of leaving GMs. Since there are logN
nodes on the path from root to leaf in the tree structure, the total number of affected
keys when l GMs leave the group is bounded by O(l  logN).
When revoking multiple GMs from OGK group, the number of messages depends on
the number of product terms in the Mmin. In [80], the authors derived an upper bound
and lower bound on the average number of products in a minimized SOPE. For
example, f000;010g are leaving GMs, and f001;011;100;101;110g are remaining
GMs, and f111g is not assigned (i.e., do not care). In this example, the minimized of
SOPE is Mmin = B0+B2 and OGK requires 2 messages while tree-based schemes
needs at least 3 messages. Now, I prove that OGK achieves
storage-communication-optimal:
Lemma 3 (Optimality of OGK) OGK achieves storage-communication-optimal.
Proof 5 In OGK, each GM is distributed a private key with logN secret shares and a
factor D= g
a+r
b with constant size. Thus, the storage overhead of OGK is O(logN).
With the logN secret shares, a GM can combine them to calculate N 1 distinct F
factors in the Decrypt Algorithm 3. Thus, each GM can decrypt N 1 encrypted
streams and OGK is storage-communication-optimal. 
Number of Messages: Worst Cases
Firstly, I analyze the OGK performance in worst cases. In the worst cases, OGK
out-performs all the tree-based schemes except Flat-Table. Since OGK requires same
number of messages as Flat-Table when revoking a set of GMs, we utilize some of the
performance results from [23].
Lemma 4 (Worst case of revoking 2 GMs) When revoking 2 GMs from a group with
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N = 2n GMs, the number of key updating messages is at most n. The worst case is
achieved when the Hamming distance between 2 GMs is n.
Proof 6 Please refer to [23]. 
As a comparison, in the same scenario, the number of keys to be updated is 2n 1,
thus ELK requires 2n 3 messages while OGK requires n messages.
Lemma 5 (worst case of revoking multiple GMs) The worst case of revoking
multiple GMs happens when both of following conditions hold: 1) there are N=2 GMs
to be revoked; 2) the Hamming distance between IDs of any two remaining GMs is at
least 2. In the worst case, the number of key updating messages is N=2.
Proof 7 Please refer to [23]. 
In this case, the number of keys to be updated is N N=2= N=2 for ELK, since there
are N non-leaf keys to be updated and the number of leaving GMs is N=2. We can see
that, in this particular worst case, OGK’s performance is same as ELK approach. We
argue that the worst cases happens in very low probability.
Lemma 6 (worst case possibility) When GMs are revoked in uniform probability, the
worst case scenario happens with probability 12N 1 . 
Proof 8 In the worst case, the Hamming distance of IDs of N=2 revoked GMs should
be at least 2. As shown in the Karnaugh table in Figure 5.2, each cell represents an
ID. For any cell marked 0 and any cell marked 1, the Hamming distance is at least 2.
Thus, the worst cases happens in two cases: (1) the encryptor wants to reach N=2
receivers marked 1 in Figure 5.2; (2) the encryptor wants to reach N=2 receivers
marked 0 in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Worst cases of broadcast encryption to N=2 receivers
Figure 5.3: Number of messages of multiple leave for a OGK group with 1024 GMs.

Number of Messages: Average Cases
To analyze the performance in average cases, I simulated OGK along with ELK [71],
which is considered as the most efficient existing scheme, in groups with 1024 GMs
and 4096 GMs, and the number of messages required are shown in Figure 5.3 and
Figure 5.4 respectively. In the simulation, I consider the cases of 5%, 25%, 50% IDs
are not assigned (i.e., do not care value). For each case, different percentages of
leaving GMs are randomly selected from the group. I repeat 100 times to average the
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Figure 5.4: Number of messages of multiple leave for a OGK group with 4096 GMs.
Figure 5.5: Size of total messages of multiple leave for a OGK group with 1024 GMs.
results. As a comparison, the message number curve of ELK is also plotted. From the
result, we can see that OGK performs better than ELK and is achieves roughly
O(logN) complexity, where the constant factor is about 20 for the 1024-GMs group
and 50 for the 4096-GMs group.
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Figure 5.6: Size of total messages of multiple leave for a OGK group with 4096 GMs.
Total Message Size Finally, I look into the message size of OGK, FT-CP-ABE[25],
and symmetric key tree-based schemes. In Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, I compare the
total ciphertext size using OGK and FT-CP-ABE.
As mentioned in [25], in FT-CP-ABE, the size of ciphertext grows linearly based on
the increase of the number of attributes in the access policy [25, 7]. Experimentally,
the message size in FT-CP-ABE starts at about 650 bytes, and each additional attribute
adds about 300 bytes. In a system with 10-bit ID or 1024 GMs, the number of
attributes using FT-CP-ABE ciphertext is at most 10 and the message size may be as
large as 650+9*300=3350 bytes. Since the number of attributes in the access policy is
bounded by logN, we can conclude that the communication overhead of FT-CP-ABE
is in the order of O(log2N).
In OGK, every ciphertext contains exactly 2 group member on G1 and 1 group
members on GT . Moreover, as we have mentioned in Section 5.1, we can combine the
elementC2 of all messages to further reduce the total ciphertext size. Empirically,
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using Type D with element compression, an element on G0 is about 21 bytes and an
element on GT is about 120 bytes. In OGK implementation, the encoded S takes n
bytes, where n is the number of bits in ID. Thus, the first message takes n+170 bytes,
e.g. if n= 10, the first message takes 180 bytes; if n= 12, the first message takes 182
bytes. Each additional message will add n+145 bytes, since the component C2 can be
reduced. In summary, OGK’s ciphertext size is is significantly smaller than the
ciphertext size reported in FT-CP-ABE [25].
Existing tree-based schemes using symmetric encryption algorithms, such as AES,
enjoys the advantage of small ciphertext. However, based on the evaluation results in
Figure 5.5 and 5.6, the total message size of OGK will be smaller than symmetric key
based schemes when the size of a group is large and number of leaving GMs is
relatively small, e.g. <%25, thanks to significantly reduced number numbers of
transmitted messages (see Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). It can be expected in large scale
systems, where the size of a multicast group is larger than 4096, OGK will be much
more efficient than other schemes.
Storage Overhead
In OGK, the storage overhead for GC is O(logN) if GC does not store IDs of GMs. In
this case, GC or GMs cannot utilize do not care values to further reduce the
membership function in SOPE form. Thus, the communication overhead might be
higher. The storage overhead is O(logN) for a GM, since GM stores a private key
component for each bit in its ID. Although the GC or GMs may need the list of GMs’
IDs along with the list of do not care IDs to perform boolean function minimization,
we can argue that this does not incur extra storage overhead.
• The encryptors do not need to store the GMs’ IDs after the multicast the data;
thus, the storage space can be released.
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Table 5.3: Comparison of Storage Overhead in Different Group Key Management
Schemes.
Scheme Storage Overhead
GC GM
OGK O(logN)/O(N) O(logN)
Flat-Table O(logN)/O(N) O(logN)
Flat-Table-ABE O(logN)/O(N) O(logN)
Subset-Diff O(N) O(log2(N))
BGW O(N
1
2 ) O(N
1
2 )
Non-Flat-Table-Tree O(N) O(logN)
• The GC can periodically publish the minimized SOPE of all do not care IDs,
which can be used by encryptors to further reduce number of messages.
• If IDs are assigned to GMs sequentially, i.e., from low to high, GC can simply
publish the lowest unassigned IDs to all GMs, who can use the all higher IDs as
do not care values.
• Even if a GM needs to store N IDs, the space is merely N logN bits. If N = 220.
• If an encryptor cannot utilize do not care values to further reduce the
membership function in SOPE form, the communication overhead might be a
little higher. As shown in Figure 5.3and Figure 5.4, the curve of 0% vacancy can
also be used as number of messages required if a broadcast encryptor does not
know the do not care IDs.
In the table 5.3, we compare the storage overhead of OGK with notable related
schemes.
In the Table 5.1, we summarized the key sizes for 1024 and 4096 group based on the
implementation. Empirically, adding 1 bit to user ID would add 296 bytes to public
key, 24 bytes to master key and 66 bytes to private key using Type D curve with
element compression.
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Table 5.4: Keys sizes for 1024 and 4096 OGK group.
1024 group 4096 group
Public Key (bytes) 4054 4650
Master Key (bytes) 528 624
Private Key (bytes) 725 857
Computation Overhead
In this section, I compare the computation overhead of those asymmetric key based
schemes. In ACP scheme, the author reports that the encryption needs O(N2) finite
field operations when the sub-group size if N; in the BGW scheme, the encryption and
decryption require O(N) operations on the bilinear group, which are heavier than
finite field operations [44, 76]. In OGK, each encryption requires logN operations on
the bilinear groups, and the decryption requires 2 pairings. Thus, the complexities of
encryption and decryption are bounded by O(logN) and O(1) respectively. Although
the problem of minimizing SOPE is NP-hard, efficient approximations are widely
known. Thus, OGK is much more efficient than ACP and BGW when group size is
large.
Experimentally, I summarized the benchmark results for OGK operations. The
benchmark was performed on a modern workstation which has a 3.0GHz Pentium 4
cpu with 2MB cache and 1.5 GB memory and runs Linux 2.6.32 kernel. Also, the
Type D curve is used. The benchmark result is presented in the Table 5.1.
Table 5.5: Computation overhead for 1024 and 4096 OGK group.
1024 group 4096 group
Setup (ms) 398 405
Kengen (ms) 293 307
Encrypt (ms) 12 13
Decrypt (ms) 36 38
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5.2 Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption
Based on the proposed construction of CCP-ABE, I construct an efficient and flexible
Broadcast Encryption (BE) scheme– Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE),
where the size of a ciphertext is still constant.
Compared to existing BE schemes, using ABBE, encryptor does not need to store a
large number of key materials, i.e., public key and private key. By carefully organizing
the attributes in the system, I will show that the storage overhead of each user can be
reduced from O(N) to O(logN+m), where N is the number of users in the system and
m N is the number of descriptive attributes in the system.
Also, in ABBE, an encryptor enjoys the flexibility of encrypting broadcast data using
either a specific list of decryptors or an access policy without giving an exact list of
decryptors.
ABBE Setup
In ABBE with N users, each user is issued an n-bit binary ID b0b1   bn, where bi
represents the i’th bit in the user’s binary ID, where n= logN. Accordingly, I can
define n bit-assignment attributes fB1;B2;    ;Bng. Each user is assigned n
bit-assignment attribute values according to his/her ID. If the bi = 1, he/she is
assigned the B+i , if the bi = 0, he/she is assigned the B
 
i . For example, in a system
with 8 possible users, each user is assigned 3 bit-assignment attributes to represent the
bit values in their ID, as illustrated in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8:
Given the n= logN the bit-assignment attributes, TA generates 3n attributes values,
i.e., bit-assigment attribute Bi has fB+i ;B i ;Bi g values.
In addition to the bit-assignment attributes, the TA also chooses m descriptive
attributes for the system. These descriptive attributes present the real properties or
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Figure 5.7: An illustration of ID distribu-
tion in ABBE.
Figure 5.8: An illustration of bit-
assignment attributes in ABBE.
features of an entity, which can be used to describe the decryptors’ social or role
features, e.g., “CS”, “EE”, “Student”, “Faculty”, etc. Each of the m descriptive
attributes has f1;0;g values.
With the 3n+3m attribute values, the authority runs Setup(n+m) algorithm and
generate public keys and private keys.
Broadcast Encryption
In order to control the access to the broadcasted message, the sender needs to specify
an access policy using either the descriptive attributes or bit-assignment attributes. For
example in the Table 5.2, if Alice wants send message to all CS students, she can
specify the descriptive policyW1 in the following table. Or she wants to send message
to Bob and Carol, whose IDs are 100 and 101 respectively, she can use the
bit-assignment policyW2, which is equivalent to enumerate every receivers.
Table 5.6: Sample Policy for Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption.
A1=CS A2=EE A3=Student A4=Faculty B0 B1 B2
W1 A+1 A
 
2 A
+
3 A
 
4 B

0 B

1 B

2
W2 A1 A

2 A

3 A

4 B
+
0 B
 
1 B

2
Here, I focus on how an encryptor can specify the list of receivers explicitly using n
bit-assignment attributes. We first define some of the terms used in the following
presentations:
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• Literal: A variable or its complement, e.g., b1, b1, etc.
• Product Term: Literals connected by AND, e.g., b2b1b0.
• Sum-of-Product Expression (SOPE): Product terms connected by OR, e.g.,
b2b1b0+b2.
Given the set of receivers S, the membership functions fS(), which is in the form of
SOPE, specifies the list of receivers:
fS(bu1;b
u
2; : : : ;b
u
n) =
8><>: 1 iff u 2 S;0 iff u =2 S:
For example, if the subgroup S= f000;001;011;111g, then
fS = b0b1b2+b0b1b2+b0b1b2+b0b1b2.
Then, the broadcast encryptor runs the Quine-McCluskey algorithm [62] to reduce fS
to minimal SOPE fminS . The reduction can consider do not care values  on those IDs
that are not currently assigned to any receiver to further reduce number of product
terms in the membership function. For example, if S= f000;001;011;111g,
fminS = b0b1+b1b2.
Since fminS is in the form of SOPE, encryption is performed on each product term.
That is, for each product term E in fminS , the encryptor specifies an AND-gate access
policyW using the following rules:
1. For positive literal bi 2 fminS , set B+i in the access policyW .
2. For negative literal bi 2 fminS , set B i in the access policyW .
3. Set Bi for the rest of bit-assignment attributes.
For eachW , the encryptor uses Encrypt(PK;W;M) algorithm to encrypt the message.
The total number of encrypted message equals to the number of product terms in fminS .
61
For example, if S= f000;001;011;111g, fminS = b0b1+b1b2. The access policiesW1
andW2 are shown in the Table 5.2:
Table 5.7: Sample Policy with Bit-Assignments for Attribute Based Broadcast Encryp-
tion.
A1 =CS A2 =EE A3 =Student A4 =Faculty B0 B1 B2
W1 A1 A

2 A

3 A

4 B
 
0 B
 
1 B

2
W2 A1 A

2 A

3 A

4 B

0 B
+
1 B
+
2
We can find that fminS contains 2 product terms. the message M for S can be encrypted
into 2 ciphertexts withW1 andW2 respectively.
Information Theoretical Optimality
In this section, I present the optimality of ABBE through an information theoretical
approach similar to the models in [74]. In Section 5.2, I proved that ABBE attains
information theoretical lower bound of storage requirements with O(logN)
bit-assignment attributes. In Section 5.2, I also compared the BGW [13] BE scheme
[13] and ABBE from information theoretical perspective.
Prefix Free Bit-Assignment Attributes Assignment
To be uniquely identified, each user’s ID should not be prefix of any other user’s. For
example, suppose a user u0 is issued an ID 00, which is prefix of u1 with ID 000 and u2
with ID 001. When an encryptor tries to reach u1 and u2, the minimized membership
function is f = x0x1, which is also satisfied by u0. Thus, it is also imperative that a
user’s bit-assignment attributes should not be a prefix of any other user’s.
Theorem 4 If I denote the number of bit-assignment attributes (or number of bits in
the ID) for a user ui by li. For an attribute based encryption system with N users and
the attribute lists of users satisfy the prefix-free condition, the set fl1; l2; : : : ; lNg
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satisfies the Kraft inequality:
N
å
i=1
2 li  1:

Proof 9 The proof is available in [29]. 
The prefix free condition is necessary and sufficient condition for addressing any user
with their bit-assignment attributes.
For a message addressed to one particular user, I use pi to denote the possibility that a
user ui is the target. Note that the ability to address to any one of the users is the
necessary condition for a functioning broadcast encryption. To reach a receiver ui, the
encryptor needs li bit-assignment attributes, i.e., storage overhead of li. From the
sender’s perspective, we model the storage overhead as:
N
å
i=1
pili: (5.3)
Intuitively, this formation argues that the storage overhead from a sender’s perspective
is the average number of bit-assignment attributes required to address to a particular
users. Thus, an optimization problem is formulated to minimize the storage overhead
for a broadcast encryption system:
min
li
N
å
i=1
pili
s.t.
N
å
i=1
2 li  1:
This problem can be further rewritten as a Lagrangian optimization problem as:
min
li
f
N
å
i=1
pili+l (
N
å
i=1
d li 1)g; (5.4)
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where l is the Lagrangian multiplier. The optimization problem is identical to the
optimal codeword-length selection problem [29] in information theory. Before giving
the solution to this optimization problem, we define the entropy of targeting one user
in the broadcast encryption system:
Definition 7 The entropy H of targeting a user in the broadcast encryption system is
H = 
N
å
i=1
pi log pi:

Theorem 5 For an broadcast encryption system of N users with prefix free
distribution of bit-assignment attributes, the optimal (i.e., minimal) average number of
attributes required for a sender to address a receiver, written as åNi=1 pili is given by
the d-ary entropy
Hd = 
N
å
i=1
pi log pi:

Proof 10 The theorem is equivalent to to optimal codeword-length selection problem
and proof is available in [29]. 
Since the average number of attributes required for addressing one particular receiver
is given by the entropy of targeting a user, we now try to derive the upper and lower
bounds of the entropy:
max
pi
 
N
å
i=i
pi log pi
and
min
pi
 
N
å
i=i
pi log pi
s.t.
N
å
i=1
pi = 1:
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The upper bound Hmax = åNi=1 1N logN = logN is yielded when pi = 1=N,
8i 2 f1;2; : : : ;Ng, when each user has equal possibility to be addressed as the receiver.
When there is no apriori information about the possibility distribution of targeting one
of the users, l = Hmax = logdN correspond to the optimal strategy to minimize the
average number of attributes required for each user. On the other hand, the lower
bound Hmin = 0 is achieved when pi = 1 for 9i 2 f1;2; : : : ;Ng, which is an extreme
case where there is no randomness and only one user is reachable.
Compare with BGW BE scheme
If we denote the proposed optimal bit-assignment attributes assignment to be
minimalist, which requires the least number of bit-assignment attributes to identity
each user. We can refer BGW scheme in [13] as maximalist. In BGW scheme, for a
system with N users, each user is mapped to a unique public key. Given all N public
keys, the number of combinations is 2N 1, which equals to the number of receiver
subsets in the system. Thus, each encryptor needs maximal number of public keys to
perform broadcast encryption.
To compare the minimalist and maximalist storage strategy, we can treat each attribute
or public key as a binary variable v 2 f1;0g. We denote p= Pv=1 as the percentage of
totals users who have this attributes or public key and 1  p= Pv=0 as the percentage
of totals users who do not have this attributes or public key, given that
P(v=1)+P(v=0) = 1.
Definition 8 The entropy of an attribute or a public key is defined as:
H(v) = p log p 1+(1  p) log(1  p) 1:

Based on the Definition 8 , we see the entropy of each attribute in minimalist strategy
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as Ha(1=2) = 1 since ,for each particular attribute, exact half of the users have it while
the other half do not have it. On the other hand, the entropy of public key in
maximalist strategy is Ha(1=N) = (1=N) log(N)+((N 1)=N) log(N=(N 1))< 1.
Hence, we can conclude that minimalist strategy attains maximal binary entropy while
the maximalist strategy attains minimal binary entropy.
5.3 Performance Analysis
In this section, I analyze the performance of ABBE and compare it with several
related solutions: subset-difference broadcast encryption scheme (Subset-Diff) [37],
BGW broadcasting encryption [14], NNL [68], DPP [30], BW [15], LT [59], access
control polynomial (ACP) scheme [101] and FT implemented using CP-ABE
(FT-ABE) [25]. I also compared some works in tree-based multicast group key
distribution domain where a group controller removes some group members by
selectively multicasting key update messages to all remaining members. Those
solution can be broadly divided into 2 categories: Flat-Table (FT) scheme [23, 100]
and Non-Flat-Table schemes, including OFT [84], LKH [93], ELK [71].
The performance is assessed in terms of communication overhead (number and size of
messages), storage overhead (system data stored on the users and system centers), and
computation overhead (number of cryptographic operations needed in encryption and
decryption operations) when a user talks to any given subgroup of users in the system.
We denote the group size be N.
Communication Overhead
The complexity analysis of communication overhead for various schemes is
summarized in Table 5.8. In Subset-Diff scheme, the communication overhead is
O(t2  log2t  logN), with t as maximum number of colluding users to compromise the
ciphertext. For BGW scheme, the message size is O(N
1
2 ) as reported in [14]. In ACP
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Table 5.8: Comparison of Communication Overhead in Different Broadcast Encryption
Schemes and Group Key Management Schemes.
Scheme Communication Overhead
single receiver multiple receivers
ABBE O(1) t O(logN)
Subset-Diff O(t2  log2t  logN) O(t2  log2t  logN)
BGW1 O(1) O(1)
BGW2 O(N
1
2 ) O(N
1
2 )
NNL1 N/A O(t log(N=t))
NNL2 N/A O(t)
DPP1 O(1) O(1)
DPP2 N/A O(t)
BW O(N
1
2 ) O(N
1
2 )
LT N/A O(t)
ACP O(N) O(N)
Flat-Table O(logN) t O(logN)
Flat-Table-ABE O(logN) t O(log2N)
Non-Flat-Table-Tree O(logN) O(l  logN)
N: the number of group members; l: the number of leaving members;
t: maximum number of colluding users to compromise the ciphertext.
scheme, the size of message depends on the degree of access control polynomial,
which equals to the number of current receivers. Thus, the message size is O(N).
For Non-flat-table tree-based multicast key distribution schemes such as OFT [84],
LKH [93], ELK [71], etc., the communication overhead for removing members
depends on the number of keys in the tree that need to be updated [87, 71]. In the case
of removing a single member, O(logN) messages are required since the center needs
to update logN auxiliary keys distributed to the removed member. Some tree-based
schemes tried to optimize the number of messages to update all the affected keys in
the case of multiple leaves. In ELK [71], which is known to be one of the most
efficient tree-based schemes, the communication overhead for multiple leaves is
O(a  l), where a l logN is the number of affected keys and l is the number of
leaving members. Thus, the complexity can be written as O(l logN).
For flat-table tree-based scheme [23], the complexity of removing a single member is
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also O(logN). The main benefit of flat-table, however, is the minimal number of
messages for batch removing multiple members. In fact, the proposed scheme requires
the same number of messages compared to flat-table scheme, thus they both achieved
information theoretical optimality. However, flat-table is vulnerable to collusion
attacks [100]. In [25], the authors proposed to implement flat-table using CP-ABE [7]
to counter collusion attacks.
To control a set of receivers S using ABBE, the number of messages depends on the
number of product terms in the fminS . In [80], the authors derived an upper bound and
lower bound on the average number of product terms in a minimized SOPE.
Experimentally, the average number of message required is  logN [25].
Number of Messages: Average Case
To investigate the average case, I simulated ABBE in a system with 512 users and
1024 users, and the number of messages required are shown in Figure 5.9 and Figure
5.10 respectively. In the simulation, I consider the cases of 0%, 5%, 25%, 50% IDs are
not assigned (i.e., do not care value). For each case, different percentages of receivers
are randomly selected from the group. I repeat 100 times to average the results. From
the result, we can see that ABBE performs achieves roughly O(logN) complexity,
where the constant factor is about 9 for the 512-member group and 18 for the
1024-member group.
Total Message Size
Finally, I look into the message size of ABBE, with comparison to FT-CP-ABE[25].
As mentioned in [25], in FT-CP-ABE, the size of ciphertext grows linearly based on
the increase of the number of attributes in the access policy [25, 7]. Experimentally,
the message size in FT-CP-ABE starts at about 630 bytes, and each additional attribute
adds about 300 bytes. In a system with 10 bit ID or 1024 users, the number of
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Figure 5.9: Number of messages in a ABBE system with 512 users.
Figure 5.10: Number of messages in a ABBE system with 1024 users.
attributes using FT-CP-ABE ciphertext is at most 10 and the message size may be as
large as 630+9 300= 3330 bytes. Since the number of attributes in the access policy
is bounded by logN, we can conclude that the communication overhead of
FT-CP-ABE is in the order of O(log2N). In ABBE, every ciphertext contains exactly
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2 group member on G0. Empirically, the size of one element on G0 is about 128 bytes.
Thus, the ciphertext in ABBE is bounded within 300 bytes, which is significantly
smaller than the ciphertext size reported in FT-CP-ABE [25]. Moreover, since the
componentC0 in the ciphertext can be shared by multiple messages, we can further
reduce the message size of ABBE with efficient communication protocol design.
Figure 5.11: Total Size of messages in a ABBE system with 512 users.
Storage Overhead
In ABBE, there are 6 logN+1 elements on G0 in the PK. Also, a user needs to store
m N descriptive attributes. Thus, the storage overhead is O(logN+m), assuming a
user does not store any IDs of other users. Although the broadcast encryptor may need
the list of receivers’ IDs along with the list of do not care IDs to perform boolean
function minimization, we can argue that this does not incur extra storage overhead.
• The encryptors do not need to store the receiver’s IDs after the broadcast; thus,
the storage space can be released.
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Figure 5.12: Total Size of messages in a ABBE system with 1024 users.
• The TA can periodically publish the minimized SOPE of all do not care IDs,
which can be used by encryptors to further reduce number of messages.
• If IDs are assigned to users sequentially, i.e., from low to high, TA can simply
publish the lowest unassigned IDs to all users, who can use the all higher IDs as
do not care values.
• Even if a user needs to store N IDs, the space is merely N logN bits. If N = 220.
• If a broadcast encryptor cannot utilize do not care values to further reduce the
membership function in SOPE form, the communication overhead might be a
little higher. As shown in Figure 5.9and Figure 5.10, the curve of 0% vacancy
can also be used as number of messages required if a broadcast encryptor does
not know the do not care IDs.
In the table 5.9, we compare the storage overhead of ABBE with several notable
related works.
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Table 5.9: Comparison of Storage Overhead in Different Broadcast Encryption
Schemes and Group Key Management Schemes.
Scheme Storage Overhead
Center User
ABBE N/A O(logN+m)
Subset-Diff O(N) O(t log t logN)
BGW1 N/A O(N)
BGW2 N/A O(N
1
2 )
NNL1 N/A O(logN)
NNL2 N/A O(log2N)
DPP1 N/A O(N)
DPP2 N/A O(1)
BW N/A O(N
1
2 )
LT N/A O(logN)
ACP O(N) O(1)
Flat-Table O(logN)/O(N) O(logN)
Flat-Table-ABE O(logN)/O(N) O(logN)
Non-Flat-Table-Tree O(N) O(logN)
N: the number of group members; l: the number of leaving members;
t: maximum number of colluding users to compromise the ciphertext.
Computation Overhead
In this section, we compare the computation overhead of those asymmetric key based
schemes and the summarized results are presented in Table 5.10. In ACP scheme, the
author reports that the encryption needs O(N2) finite field operations when the
sub-group size if N; in the BGW scheme, the encryption and decryption require O(N)
operations on the bilinear group, which are heavier than finite field operations
[44, 76]. In ABBE, each encryption requires logN operations on the G0, and the
decryption requires 2 logN+1 pairings and logN(logN 1)+ logN operations on G0
and logN operations on G1 . Thus, the complexities of encryption and decryption are
bounded by O(logN). Although the problem of minimizing SOPE is NP-hard,
efficient approximations are widely known. Thus, ABBE is much more efficient than
ACP and BGW when group size is large.
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Table 5.10: Comparison of Computation Complexity in Different Broadcast Encryption
Schemes.
Scheme Computation Overhead
Encryption Decryption
ABBE O(logN) O(logN)
BGW O(M) O(M)
ACP O(M2) O(1)
N: the number of group members;
M: the number of receivers.
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Chapter 6
Privacy Preserving Attribute Based Security System
In this chapter, I consider the privacy issues of ABSS, in particular the receiver
anonymity. To protect the receivers’ privacy, I proposed two different models, namely
hidden policy constant ABE (HPC-ABE) and gradual identity exposure (GIE).
6.1 Hidden Policy Constant Attribute Based Encryption
In this section, I present the construction of hidden policy constant attribute based
encryption (HPC-ABE).
Overview
One major problem of existing CP-ABE schemes is bulky, linearly increasing
ciphertext. In the CP-ABE schemes reported in [7, 16, 53], the size of a ciphertext
proliferates linearly with respect to the number of included attributes. For example,
the message size in BSW CP-ABE [7] starts at about 630 bytes, and each additional
attribute adds about 250 300 bytes.
Recently, Herranz et al. [48] proposed a CP-ABE that requires constant ciphertext
size. However, it does not consider the anonymity of data recipients and the data
access policies are attached to the ciphertexts in plaintext form. Thus, passive
attackers can track a user or infer the sensitivity of ciphertext by eavesdropping the
access policies. In many environments, it is also critical to protect the access policies
as well as the data content. For example, the access policy “General” AND
“Pentagon” disclose the recipient’s roles or positions and implies the sensitivities of
the message. On the other hand, existing privacy preserving schemes [53, 69] protect
the access policies but require large, linearly increasing ciphertext size. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no work that can achieve privacy-preserving and constant
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ciphertext size in the same time.
In this section, a novel hidden policy ABE construction, named Hidden Policy
Constant Attribute Based Encryption (HPC-ABE) is proposed, which enforces hidden
access policies with wildcards and incurs constant-size conjunctive headers, regardless
of the number of attributes. Each conjunctive ciphertext header only requires 2 bilinear
group elements, which are bounded by 100 bytes in total (Actual size of bilinear group
depends on the parameters chosen. In our implementation, we are using Type D
MNT curve with element compression [61]). To support disjunctive or more flexible
access policies, multiple constant-size conjunctive headers can be attached to the same
ciphertext message. It should be noted that we restricted the each ciphertext header to
be conjunctive in order to avoid ambiguity while preserving receivers’ anonymity.
Moreover, HPC-ABE supports non-monotonic data access control policy. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first construction that achieves these properties, namely:
privacy-preserving and constant-size conjunctive headers with wildcards.
Attributes, Policy and Anonymity
LetU = fAigi2[1;k] be the Universe of attributes in the system. Each Ai has three
values: fA+i ;A i ;Ai g. When a user u joins the system, u is tagged with an attribute list
defined as follows:
Definition 9 A user’s attribute list is defined as L= fL[i]i2[1;k]g, where
L[i] 2 fA+i ;A i g and k is the number of attributes in the universe. 
Intuitively, A+i denotes the user has Ai; A
 
i denotes the user does not have Ai or Ai is
not a proper attribute of this user. For example, suppose
U = fA1 = CS;A2 = EE;A3 = Faculty;A4 = Studentg. Alice is a student in CS
department; Bob is a faculty in EE department; Carol is a faculty holding a joint
75
position in EE and CS department. Their attribute lists are illustrated in the following
table:
Attributes L[1] L[2] L[3] L[4]
Description CS EE Faculty Student
Alice A+1 A
 
2 A
 
3 A
+
4
Bob A 1 A
+
2 A
+
3 A
 
4
Carol A+1 A
+
2 A
+
3 A
 
4
As the actually data access policy is hidden in the ciphertext header, effective
measures are required to avoid ambiguity. In other words, when a decryptor receives a
ciphertext header without knowing the access policy, he/she should NOT try a large
number of access policies when performing decryption. To this end, I adopt a
AND-gate policy construction so that each decryptor only need to try once on each
ciphertext header.
The hidden AND-gate access policy is defined in below:
Definition 10 Let W = fW [i]gi2[1;k] be an AND-gate access policy, where
W [i] 2 fA+i ;A i ;Ai g. We use the notation L j=W to denote that the attribute list L of a
user satisfies W, as:
L j=W ()W  L
[
fAi gi2[1;k]:

A+i or A
 
i requires the exact same attribute in user’s attribute list. As for A

i , it denotes
a wildcard value, which means the policy does not care the value of attribute Ai.
Effectively, each user with either A+i or A
 
i fulfills A

i automatically.
Accordingly, we also define an anonymized AND-gate policy that removes all
identifying attribute values, i.e. fA+i ;A i g, except do-not-care values, i.e. Ai .
Formally, we define an anonymized AND-gate policy as follows:
Definition 11 Let W =W
TfAi gi2[1;k] be an anonymized AND-gate access policy.
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For example, to specify an access policyW1 for all CS Student and an access policy
W2 for all CS people:
Table 6.1: Exemplary access policies and anonymized policies.
Attributes W [1] W [2] W [3] W [4]
Description CS EE Faculty Student
W1 A+1 A
 
2 A
 
3 A
+
4
W 1 ? ? ? ?
W2 A+1 A
 
2 A

3 A

4
W 2 ? ? A3 A

4
The anonymity is defined as ”the state of being not identifiable within a set of
subjects,i.e. the anonymity set. As the access policy is one-to-many mapped to users,
we can extend this definition of policy anonymity set of blinded policy as:
Definition 12 The anonymity set of a blinded policy W is the set of access policies
who are identically blinded to W.
Here, we briefly analyze the anonymity level the blinded access policy. Firstly, if there
is no wildcards in the original access policy (hidden), the blinded policyW will be
empty. In this case, the size of anonymity set is 2k, as there are 2k possible access
policies blinded toW . If there are j wildcards in the original access policy (hidden),
the size of anonymity set is 2k  j.
HPC-ABE Construction Overview
The HPC-ABE scheme consists of four fundamental algorithms:
• Setup(k)
The Setup algorithm takes input k as the number of attributes in the system. It
returns public key PK and master keyMK. The public key is used for
encryption while the master key is used for private key generation.
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• KeyGen(PK;MK;L)
The KeyGen algorithm takes the public key PK, the master key MK and the
user’s attribute list L as input . It outputs the private key of the user.
• Encrypt(PK;W;M)
The Encrypt algorithm takes the public key PK, the specified access policyW
and the messageM as input. The algorithm outputs ciphertextCT such that only
a user with attribute list satisfying the access policy can decrypt the message.
The ciphertext also associates the anonymized access policyW .
• Decrypt(PK;SK;CT)
The Decrypt algorithm decrypts the ciphertext when the user’s attribute list
satisfies the access policy. It takes the public key PK, the private key SK of the
user and the ciphertextCT , which only includes the anonymized access policy
W as input. It returns a valid plaintextM if L j=W , where L is the user’s
attribute list andW is the access policy hidden from the ciphertext.
Setup
Assuming there are k attributes fA1;A2;    ;Akg in the system, we have K = 3k
attributes values since each attribute Ai has 3 values: fA+i ;A i ;Ai g. For ease of
presentation, we map the attribute values to integer numbers as depicted in the Table
6.2.
Table 6.2: Mapping attribute values to numbers.
Attributes A1 A2 A3    Ak
A+i 1 2 3    k
A i k+1 k+2 k+3    2k
Ai 2k+1 2k+2 2k+3    3k
Let G0 be the bilinear group of prime order p. Trusted Authority (TA) first picks a
random generator g 2G0 and a random a 2 Zp. It computes gi = g(a i) for
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i= 1;2;    ;K;K+2;    ;2K where K = 3k. Next, TA picks a random g 2 Zp and sets
v= gg 2G0. The public key is:
PK = (g;g1; : : : ;gK;gK+2; : : : ;g2K;v) 2G2K+10 :
The master keyMK = fg;ag is guarded by the TA.
Key Generation
Each user u is tagged with the attribute list Lu = fLu[i]i2[1;k]g when joining the system,
where 1 Lu[i] 2k. The TA first selects k random numbers frigi2[1;k] from Zp and
calculate r = åki=1 ri.
The TA computes D= ggr = vr. For 8i 2 [1;k], TA calculates
Di = gg(a
Lu[i]+ri) = ggLu[i] ggri and Fi = gg(a
2k+i+ri) = gg2k+i ggri .
The private key for user u is computed as:
SKu = (D; fDigi2[1;k];fFigi2[1;k]):
Encryption
The encrypter picks a random t in Zp and sets the one-time symmetric encryption key
Key= e(gK;g1)kt . Suppose AND-gate policy isW with k attributes. Each attribute is
either positive/negative or wildcards.
The encryptor first encrypts the message using symmetric key Key as fMgKey. The
encryptor also sets C0 = gt . Then, it calculates C1 = (vÕ j2W gK+1  j)t . Also, the
encryptor anonymizes the access policyW by removing all attribute values except
do-not-care values, i.e. Ai , and outputsW =W
TfAi gi2[1;k].
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Finally, the ciphertext is:
CT = (W ;fMgKey;gt ;(vÕ
j2W
gK+1  j)t)
= (W ;fMgKey;Hdr)
where the ciphertext header Hdr = fC0;C1g.
Decryption
Before performing decryption, the decryptor u has has little information about the
access policy that enforced over the ciphertext. Only if Lu j=W can u successfully
recover the valid plaintext and access policy. Otherwise, u can only get a random
string which can be easily detected. Moreover, the access policy remain unknown to
the unsuccessful decryptors.
First of all, u constructs a local guess of access policy, denoted as eW , as follows:
Algorithm 4 Construct local guess eW
Initialize eW =W
for i= 1 to k do
ifW [i] ==? theneW [i] = Lu[i];
end if
end for
return eW ;
For 8i 2 [1;k], u calculates the T0 and T1 as follows.
T0 = e(g eW [i];C1)
= e(ga
eW [i]
;gt(g+å j2 eW aK+1  j))
= e(g;g)tga
eW [i]+tå j2 eW aK+1  j+ eW [i]
And if eW [i] 2 Lu, u computes:
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T1 = e(D[i]  Õ
j2 eW ; j 6= eW [i]gK+1  j+ eW [i];C0)
= e(gt ;gg(a
eW [i]+ri)+å j2 eW ; j 6= eW [i]aK+1  j+ eW [i])
= e(g;g)tg(a
eW [i]+ri)+tå j2 eW ; j 6= eW [i]aK+1  j+ eW [i]:
Else, if eW [i] 2 fAi gi2[1;k], u computes:
T1 = e(F[i]  Õ
j2 eW ; j 6= eW [i]gK+1  j+ eW [i];C0)
= e(gt ;gg(a
eW [i]+ri)+å j2 eW ; j 6= eW [i]aK+1  j+ eW [i])
= e(g;g)tg(a
eW [i]+ri)+tå j2 eW ; j 6= eW [i]aK+1  j+ eW [i]:
Then, we calculate
T0=T1 = e(g;g) tgri+ta
K+1
:
After u calculate all k terms, we make a production of all the quotient terms and get:
e(g;g) tg(r1+r2++rk)+kta
k+1
= e(g;g) tgr+kta
K+1
:
u calculates:
e(D;C0) = e(g;g)tgr:
Then, u produces these two terms and get Key= e(g;g)kta
K+1
= e(gK;g1)kt and
decrypt the message. If the decrypted message is valid, eW =W and u decrypt the
ciphertext successfully. Otherwise, u has no information on theW and the anonymity
set ofW does not change.
Security Game for HPC-ABE
A HPC-ABE scheme is considered to be secure against chosen CPA if no probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries have non-negligible advantages in this game.
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Init: The adversary choose the challenge access policyW and give it to challenger.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives adversary the PK.
Phase 1: The adversary submits L for a KeyGen query, where L 2W . The challenger
answers with a secret key SK for L. This can be repeated adaptively
Challenge: The challenger runs Encrypt algorithm to obtain f<C0;C1 >;Keyg. Next,
the challenger picks a random b 2 f0;1g. It sets Key0 = Key and picks a random Key1
with same length to Key0 in G1. It then gives f<C0;C1 >;Keybg to the adversary.
Phase 2: Same as Phase 1.
Guess: The adversary outputs its guess b0 2 f0;1g and it wins the game if b0 = b.
Note that the adversary may make multiple secret key queries both before and after the
challenge, which result in the collusion resistance in the proposed scheme. We also
point out this CPA security game is called as selective ID security, because the
adversary must submit a challenge access structure before the setup phase.
Theorem 6 If a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary wins the CPA game with
non-negligible advantage, then we can construct a simulator that distinguish a
K-DBHE tuple with non-negligible advantage. 
Security Proof
We reduce CPA security of the proposed scheme to decisional K-BDHE assumption.
We first define the decryption proxy to model collusion attackers.
Definition 13 (Decryption Proxy) In order to model the collusion attacks, we define
2k decrypting proxies in the security game. Each decrypting proxy pi(r) = gg(a
i+r),
where r 2 Zp and i 2 f1;    ;2kg, i.e., a private key component corresponding to a
particular attribute value.
In collusion attacks against access policyW , a user with attribute list L 3W collude
with x k decryption proxies to attack the ciphertext. We call the colluding with x
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decryption proxy as x-collusion. Intuitively, x-collusion means the attacker needs x
attributes values, say fi1; i2;    ; ixg to add to his attribute list L such that
L[fi1; i2;    ; ixg j=W . Note that 0-collusion means no decryption proxy is used and
user does not collude.
Proof of Theorem 6 :
Suppose that an adversary A wins the selective game for HPC-ABE with the
advantage e . Then, we can construct a SimulatorB that breaks decisional K-BDHE
assumption with the advantage
maxfe=2;(1 q=p)le=2;(1  (1  (1 q=p)l)m)e=2g= e=2. The simulatorB takes
an input a random decisional K-BDHE challenge
< h;g;Yg;a;K ;Z >;
where Z is either e(g;h)a
(K+1)
or a random element on G0. B now plays the role of
challenger in the pre-defined CPA game:
Init: A sends toB the access policyW that A wants to be challenged.
Setup: B runs the Setup algorithm to generate PK. B chooses random d 2 Zp and
generates:
v= gd(Õ
j2W
gK+1  j) 1 = gd å j2W a
K+1  j
= gg :
TheB outputs the PK as:
PK = (g;Yg;a;K ;v) 2G2K+10 :
Phase 1: The adversary A submits an attribute list L for a private key query, where
L 2W . There must exist a j in L such that: either j 2 f1;    ;kg and j+ k 2W or
j 2 fk+1;    ;2kg and j  k 2W .
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The simulatorB first selects k random numbers ri 2 Zp for i= 1 : : :k and set
r = r1+   + rk. Then,B generates
D= (gd Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) 1)r
= g(d å j2W a
K+1  j)r
= ggr:
Then, for all i 2 L+ and i+ k 2W : B generates:
Di = gdi Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j+i) 1guri0 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) ri0 ;
where i0 = i.
For all i 2 L  and i  k 2W : B generates:
Di = gdi Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j+i) 1guri0 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) ri0 ;
where i0 = i  k.
For all i 2 L and i =2W : B generates:
Fi = gdi Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j+i) 1guri0 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) ri0 ;
where i0 = i 2k.
Note that each for each Di or Fi is valid since:
Di = (gd(Õ
j2W
gK+1  j) 1)(a
i+ri0) = gg(a
i+ri0);
and
Fi = (gd(Õ
j2W
gK+1  j) 1)(a
i+ri0) = gg(a
i+ri0):
Challenge: The simulatorB sets <C0;C1 > as < h;hd >. It then gives the challenge
f<C0;C1 >;Zkg to A .
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To see the validity of challenge, C0 = h= gt for some unknown t. Then:
hd = (gd)t
= (gd Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j) 1 Õ
j2W
(gK+1  j))t
= (vÕ
j2W
(gK+1  j))t ;
and if Z = e(g;h)a
(K+1)
, then Zk = Key.
Phase 2: Repeat as Phase 1.
Guess: The adversary A output a guess b0 of b. When b0 = 0, A guesses that
Z = e(g;h)a
(K+1)
. When b0 = 1, A guesses Z is a random element.
If Z is a random element, then the Pr[B(h;g;Yg;a;K ;Z) = 0] = 12 .
Before considering the case when Z == e(g;h)a
(K+1)
, we explain how we use
decryption proxy in the proof. Each decryption proxy pi(r) simulates a legal private
key component embedded with random number r. When calling pi(r), A passes a
random r as a guess of the ri0 , which is the random number embedded in the Di or Fi,
where i 2W . As a matter of fact, the procedure of calling decryption proxy mimics
the collusion of multiple users, who combine their private key components.
Lemma 7 (probability of collision with 1 decryption proxy) Suppose the A has
issued q private queries and there is only 1 attribute i =2W, A queries pi(r) l times.
The possibility that the none of the queries returns a legal private key component of
any q is (1 q=p)l . 
Proof 11 The possibility that the one query does not return a legal private key
component of any q is 1 q=p. Thus, if none of the l query succeed, the probability
Pr[r 6= ri0 ] = (1 q=p)l , where r is the random number in decryption proxy, ri0 is the
random number embedded in the private key, q is the number of private key queries in
85
phase 1 and phase 2, l is the number of calling decryption proxy with different r, and
p is the order of Zp. 
Lemma 8 (probability of collision with m decryption proxy) Suppose the A has
issued q private queries and there is m attributes violate the W, A queries each of the
m decryption proxy pi1(r1); pi2(r2);    ; pim(rm) l times. The possibility that the none
of the queries returns a legal private key component of any q is (1  (1 q=p)l)m. 
Proof 12 The probability that 1 decryption proxy fails is Pr[r 6= ri0] = (1 q=p)l . The
probability that all the m decryption proxy successfully return legal components is
(1  (1  (q=p)l))m. In the case of not all m succeed, the probability is
Pr[ri j 6= ri0j ;9 j  m] = 1  (1  (1 q=p)l)m. 
If Z == e(g;h)a
(K+1)
, we consider the following cases:
• 0-Collusion: If no decryption proxy is used, A has at least e=2 advantage in
breaking the proposed scheme, thenB has at least e advantage in breaking
K-BDHE, i.e.,
jPr[B(h;g;Yg;a;K ;Z) = 0]  12 j  e=2:
• 1-collusion If 1 decryption proxy, say pi(r) is used, Pr[r 6= ri0] = (1 q=p)l ,
where r is the random number in decryption proxy, ri0 is the random number
embedded in the private key, q is the number of private key queries in phase 1
and phase 2, l is the number of calling decryption proxy with different r, and p
is the order of Zp. Note that if r = ri0 , A can use pi(r) as a valid private key
component to compromise the ciphertext.
If the A has at least e advantage in breaking the proposed scheme, thenB has
at least (1 q=p)le=2 advantage in breaking K-BDHE.
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• m-collusion If m decryption proxies, say
pi1(r1); pi2(r2);    ; pim(rm)
are used. The possibility that Pr[ri j 6= ri0j ;9 j  m] = (1  (1  (q=p)l))m, where
rm is the random number in m decryption proxy pim(rim) for the private key
component im, ri0m is the random number generated for the A , q is the number of
private key queries in phase 1 or phase 2, l is the number of calling m decryption
proxies with different r’s, p is the order of Zp.
If the A has at least e advantage in breaking the proposed scheme, thenB has
at least (1  (1  (1 q=p)l)m)e=2 advantage in breaking K-BDHE.
6.2 Gradual Identity Exposure
In this section, the Gradual Identity Exposure (GIE) is presented.
Overview
In the hidden policy based solutions, the data access policy is removed from the
ciphertext. Although hidden policy schemes ensure the perfect anonymity, they are not
flexible and incur significant computation overhead for each user in the system.
Firstly, the hidden access policies must contain all attributes predefined in the entire
system to avoid ambiguity. In practice, the number of predefined attributes may
proliferate into thousands, which makes the hidden access policy cumbersome and
encryption/decryption processes expensive. Another critical drawback of hidden
policy approaches is that each receiver is required to “try” to decrypting all the
ciphertexts they received. Only after the receivers finished the decryption process, can
they know whether they satisfy the associated policies. While the decryption can be
comparatively efficient for hidden policy schemes, where receivers only need to check
his own identity, hidden policy schemes require much more computation because the
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policy may contain a large number of attributes and the receivers need to check all
attributes to perform decryption.
To address the drawbacks of hidden policy schemes, we develop a new identity
management scheme , named Gradual Identity Exposure (GIE), to protect recipients’
anonymity and reduce incurred complexities. GIE has the following capabilities:
• A user’s identity is exposed step-by-step based on receivers’ authorized
capabilities. It each step, the decryptor needs to satisfy certain attributes to
reveal next step attributes. Otherwise, decryption fails immediately and the
decryptor learns nothing more than the attributes he/she is entitled. More
importantly, the unintended receivers quit decryption procedure as early as
possible to save computing power. This is fundamentally different to the rigid
concept of using hidden policy: “Try to decrypt the entire ciphertext, if it is
decrypted, the policy will be revealed; otherwise, policy will be absolutely
unknown”, where most receivers will waste computing power on unintended
ciphers.
• GIE is flexible in that it does not require a pre-established policy agreement.
Each user can specify a procedure to expose an identity gradually, based on
his/her security requirements without negotiating with the message receivers.
This property makes the identity management adaptable in various
un-predictable application scenarios.
• GIE can incorporate security data access policies effectively, when we consider
the procedures of exposing attributes as security policies. The gradual exposure
property of GIE enables an identity management system to reveal an identity in
a prioritized fashion, which can help a secure system to build a hierarchical
identity management system.
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• GIE can be integrated with role-based data access control naturally. GIE reveals
attributes of the role information in a step-by-step fashion based on receivers’
role, which can be used as role-based data access control without major
modifications.
Although GIE does expose some information of receivers’ identities (or attributes), we
find that this property is quite useful in some environments, such as Enterprise
networks, since receivers can learn some information they are authorized to know. For
example, in a large company’s intra-networks, messages are encrypted and
broadcasted to all departments. Each department has a server to backup messages
targeted to its department, and this server only has the attributes assigned to
department, e.g. ”R&D”. One sensitive message may be encrypted by policy
f”R&D”, ”StaffEngineer”, ”Female”g in sequence, where attribute ”R&D” is revealed
first. Although the server cannot learn all attributes in the policy, it can identify
attribute ”R&D” and backup the message.
To measure the amount of revealed information during the identity exposure
procedure, we present an information theoretical approach to measure the uncertainty
reduction for each exposure step using set theory. We use set reduction to represent
the uncertainty reduction. In this paper, without special notice, we use uncertainty
reduction and set reduction interchangeably, although uncertainty is usually
represented using Shannon information theory. Based on the GIE model, we further
propose a new concept: Optimal Identity Exposure (OIE), which requires the identity
exposure procedure to reveal the minimal amount of information when a receiver fails
the decryption process. Based on the investigations, we found that the OIE cannot be
guaranteed for an arbitrarily selected composition of attributes. However, we prove
that if OIE exists in a given set of attributes, we can always find the optimality by
using a deterministic polynomial searching algorithm. To handle the scenarios that
OIE does not exist, we propose two algorithms: Pre-k-optimal and Post-k-Optimal
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Identity Exposure to reveal an identity at the k far-end and close-end optimal steps,
respectively, in the identity exposure procedure. Intuitively, the Pre-k-optimal ensures
the maximal anonymity in beginning steps, while Post-k-optimal ensures in ending
steps.
The construction of GIE is based on a heavily customized version of
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [7] by disclosing attributes
and corresponding tree structure gradually in the process of decryption. In this way,
unauthorized receivers can only learn partial information of receivers’ identities, since
they will stop at a certain step during the decryption procedure. The presented
techniques do not increase the complexity of encrypting and decrypting messages with
the original CP-ABE scheme. GIE also inherits the security features, such as collusion
resistance, provided by the CP-ABE scheme presented in [7].
System and Models
In this section, we present the system and models which are required to construct the
proposed solution. We first present the definitions and new concepts of GIE. Then, the
communication model and attack model are presented in sequence at the end of this
section.
The GIE construction is based on set theory. We first describe several notations shown
in below:
• y is an attribute.
• H is a one-way hash functionH : f0;1g!f0;1gl .
• Sy represents the set of users with attribute y. The cardinality of this set is
represented as jSyj. The intersection of two attributes yi and y j is represented as
Syi
T
Sy j and the union of these two attributes is presented as Syi
S
Sy j . f
represents an empty set and jSni=1 Syij= N.
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• Anonymity is in the state of being not identifiable within an anonymity set S.
An anonymity set is the set of all possible entities j 2 S.
Now, we are ready to present several definitions. Despite the English definition of
identity, i.e., a term uniquely pinpoints to a person, we extend the definition of identity
as follows:
Definition 14 (Identity) An identity I = fy1; : : : ;yng is a set of attributes (i.e., terms)
that can be used to identify a user or a group (or a set) of users. An attribute may not
be unique to distinguish a user or a group of users. 
Definition 15 (Anonymity) We define Ñfy1;:::;ymg as the anonymity of a set of
attributes fy1; : : : ;ymg, which is measured by the cardinality jT8yi2fy1;:::;ymg Syi j.
Usually, one attribute yi can create a certain level of anonymity, which is determined
by the cardinality of its set Syi .
The intersection of multiple attributes will reduce the uncertainty. We have:
Ñfyiji2f1;:::;ngg= j \
i2f1;:::;ng
Syi j 
Sy j8 j : (6.1)
Definition 16 (Gradual Identity Exposure) The attributes describing an identity are
gradually exposed in a one-by-one fashion and the anonymity is monotonically
decreasing. In other words, at any particular step, exposing attribute y j will not
increase the anonymity. We can have the following formula:
Ñf:::y j 1g  Ñf:::;y j 1;y jg; where j  1: (6.2)

For example, if we have the following four attributes y1 =fASU employeeg,
y2 =ffaculty at ASUg, y3 =ffemale faculty at computer science at ASUg, and
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y4 =ffaculty teaching database at ASUg. In this example, we have
jSy4j< jSy3j< jSy2 j< jSy1j, and jSy4
T
Sy3
T
Sy2
T
Sy1 j less than the cardinality of any
given set. We also notice that Sy3  Sy2  Sy1 and Sy4  Sy2  Sy1 . Sy3 and Sy4 have
intersection, but they are not inclusive since faculty teaching database may not just in
computer science department. However, one thing that we can determine from the
above discussion, i.e., with the information exposure from larger set to smaller set, we
can be more sure of the identified entity. The intersection of exposed set determines
the uncertainty level to identify one or multiple entities. Thus, we have
jÑfy1gj  jÑfy1;y2gj  jÑfy1;y2;y3gj  jÑfy1;y2;y3;y4gj.
Definition 17 (Optimal Identity Exposure) For a given set of l attributes
fy1; : : : ;ylg, there are l! possible exposure procedures. For a given procedure number
j, we denote the anonymity at step i as Ñ ji , i.e. the anonymity after exposing i’th
attributes in the procedure. If the optimal identity exposure procedure exists, it must
satisfy the following properties:
1. The sequence of exposed attributes set must satisfy (6.2).
2. For any step i, The anonymity Ñi is always maximized:
Ñi =maxfÑ1i ; : : : ;Ñl!i g 8 0 i n: (6.3)
3. The optimality may not exist. However, if the optimality exists, there is a
polynomial algorithm to find the optimal identity exposure sequence.

Definition of Optimal Identity Exposure describes a scenario that the overall system
uncertainty (or remaining system uncertainty) is always the maximal after each
uncertainty reduction step.
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10
25
20
15
65
50
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|Sy1|=110
|Sy2|=100
|Sy3|=90
(b)
Figure 6.1: Uncertainty reduction with gradual identity exposure.
For example, in Fig. 6.1(a), after y1 and y2 are exposed, the overall system uncertainty
is jS1TS2j. The higher the jS1TS2j value, the larger the value of the overall system
anonymity. Thus, to achieve the best anonymity, we need to keep the system
uncertainty at its maximum when selecting an attribute to expose.
Satisfying property 2 guarantees that we can always achieve the maximal overall
system anonymity after each step (except the last step, which can have maximal
anonymity reduction). Based on the property 2, we can draw an uppner-bound of the
optimal identity exposure shown in Fig. 6.1(a). Additionally, we can also draw
lower-bound in the figure by restricting each step expose maximal information, which
makes overall system anonymity at its minimal level. We must note that the upper
bound and lower bound may not exist for all cases.
Property 3 states that the optimal solution of identity exposure may not always exist.
However, if the optimal solution exists, we can always find a polynomial algorithm to
derive the optimality. To prove the optimal solution may not exist, we can simply
present an example. In Fig. 6.1(b), three sets Sy1 , Sy2 , Sy2 , and their intersections are
presented. The number in each area represents the size of corresponding set. There are
6 possible exposure sequences, which are listed in below:
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No. Exposure Se-
quence
Anonymity Optimal
at step
1
Optimal
at step
2
Optimal
at step
3
1 y1 ! y2 ! y3 110! 25! 10 X X
2 y1 ! y3 ! y2 110! 30! 10 X X
3 y2 ! y1 ! y3 100! 25! 10 X
4 y2 ! y3 ! y1 100! 35! 10 X X
5 y3 ! y1 ! y2 90! 30! 10 X
6 y3 ! y2 ! y1 90! 35! 10 X X
In this example, the best first step exposure is sequence 1 or 2, and the best second
step exposure is sequence 4 and 6. Thus, there is no optimal sequence exposure.
To prove that there exists a polynomial algorithm to derive the optimal solution, we
can simply design a greedy algorithm by searching the minimal uncertainty reduction
set at each step from the starting identity or searching the maximal uncertainty
reduction set in the reversed order from the ending identity. In step j, there are n  j
set combinations to be evaluated, thus the complexity is bounded by:
n+(n 1)+(n 2)+   +1= O(n2):
Since the optimal solution may not always exist, we proposed Pre-k-optimal Identity
Exposure and Post-k-Optimal Identity Exposure, where k is a variable depends on the
set compositions. For example, as shown in Fig. 6.1(b) and the above table, there are
pre-1-optimal arrangements, namely y1 ! y2 ! y3 and y1 ! y3 ! y2. There are
post-2-optimal arrangements, namely y2 ! y3 ! y1 and y3 ! y2 ! y1.
Converting Arbitrary Identity Tree to Fixed DNF form
An attribute tree can be formed by multiple logic gates and attributes. Although an
attribute tree can be any form of tree structure, it can always be transformed to the
disjunctive normal form (DNF), which has at most three-level tree including leaf
nodes, with first(root) level to be OR gate and second level to be AND gate and third
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y1 y2
y3
y1 y3 y2 y3
(a) (b)
Figure 6.2: Example of transform an access policy to 3-level tree representing a dis-
junctive normal form.
level to be attribute leafs. For example, in Fig. 6.2, (a) can be transformed to (b)
expressed as (y1
V
y3)
W
(y2
V
y3). In this paper, we assume that an attribute tree has at
most three levels including leaf nodes.
Communication Model
In the presented system, we need to confine an administrative domain, in which all
users must trust the domain manager (i.e., trusted third party - TTP). Each user derives
a set of attributes and corresponding private keys from the TTP based on the proposed
solutions. TTP can be either online or offline depending on the types of applications
using GIE. When the TTP is online, since it knows the exact number of users
registered for each attributes, TTP can provide an online query service by accepting
the requests from end users. The TTP can generate a correct sequence to satisfy the
optimal identity exposure requirements. When users cannot reach the TTP, they need
to construct the attribute tree by themselves and arrange the exposure sequence based
on his/her own knowledge of the size of each attribute. Users’ decisions may not
accurately reflect the size of involved attribute size, but it is very flexible, and it can be
applied in the scenario that the TTP is offline.
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Attack Model
Attackers’ goal is to compromise the anonymity features provided by GIE. Attackers
can be either internal or external users of a given administrative domain. In order to
compromise the proposed GIE scheme, attackers can collude to derive the extra
information that each of them alone cannot derive.
Constructions of Gradual Identity Exposure
In this section, we present the detailed cryptographic construction to enable gradual
exposure of an identity. In Section 6.2, we first consider how to convert a AND-gate
access policy to a AND-gate chain that allows the system to expose attributes in a
one-by-one fashion. Next, in Section 6.2, we present how to encrypt a message using
the AND gate chain to allow a decryptor to discover the identity gradually in the
decryption process.
y1 y2 y3
y3
y2
y1
Figure 6.3: Converting an AND access policy tree to an AND gate chain.
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Construction of AND Gate Chain
An identity is created by an attribute tree through an AND gate, which requires the
decryptor possesses private keys for each attribute in the tree to reveal the whole
identity. Different attributes may have different anonymity levels, which is determined
by the set cardinality. In Fig. 6.3, we present a conversion from a one-level AND-gate
chain to a multiple-level AND-gate chain. Attributes with low anonymity should be
hidden, unless a decryptor possesses all attributes having a lower anonymity level. In
other words, attributes in an AND-logic-gate tree are exposed to decryptor gradually
in the process of decryption. Only if the decryptor has the attribute and the
corresponding private keys for current step, he/she can learn the attributes required for
next step. On the other hand, if the decryptor does not have the attribute for current
step, the attribute for next step cannot be revealed.
Since an optimal solution may not always exist, we need to produce an approximate
solution to create an good enough exposure sequence. To this end, we propose
Post-k-optimal and Pre-k-optimal searching algorithms. To construct the
pre-k-optimal and post-k-optimal, where k is maximized, we propose two greedy
algorithms. The forward greedy algorithm can find a pre-k-optimal sequence with
some maximized k steps where the anonymity is maximized, and a backward greedy
algorithm can find a post-k-optimal sequence with some maximized k steps where the
anonymity is maximized. Note that, for the same set of attributes in the AND-gate
chain, the value of k found by pre-k-optimal algorithm may be different from the k
found by post-k-optimal algorithm. For example, as shown in Fig. 6.1(b) and the
above table, there are pre-k-optimal arrangements, where kmax = 1, namely
y1 ! y2 ! y3 and y1 ! y3 ! y2. There are post-k-optimal arrangements, where
kmax = 2, namely y2 ! y3 ! y1 and y3 ! y2 ! y1.
It is easy to prove, that both forward greedy algorithm and backward greedy algorithm
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Algorithm 5 Pre-k-Optimal(T ).
Require: T is a structure of an AND gate connecting multiple attributes, and T 0 is the
computed exposure sequence, where initially T 0 = Ø;
while jT 0j 6= jT j do
Find the largest jSy\ST 0j where y 2 T and y 62 T 0;
Append y to the end of T 0;
end while
return T 0
Algorithm 6 Post-k-Optimal(T ).
Require: T is a structure of an AND gate connecting multiple attributes, and T 0 is the
computed exposure sequence, where T 0 = Ø
while jT j 6= 0 do
Find the largest jSTnfygj where y 2 T ;
Remove y from T ;
Append y to beginning of T 0;
end while
return T 0
can find the best sequence to satisfy the overall system anonymity for maximized k
steps.
System Setup
In this section, we describe how the trusted third party (TTP) set up the system. TTP
first defines the following functions:
• parent(x): return the parent node of x;
• The access tree T also defines an ordering between the children of every node,
that is, the children of a node are numbered from 1 to num. The function
index(x) returns such a number associated with the node x.
Then, TTP generates the following parameters. Note that the public key is a
system-wise public parameter used for encryption and decryption. The master key is
the system secret well guarded by TTP.
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• Bilinear map: G0G0 !G1 of prime order p with generator g;
• Two random a , b 2 Zp;
• Public key PK =<G0;g;gb ;g1=b ;e(g;g)a >;
• Master key is < b ;ga >.
Key Generation
After the setup of system, each user need to be generate a set of private key
components corresponding to his identity, i.e. the set of attributes. The key generation
algorithm is same to the BSW’s scheme in [7]. The key generation algorithm will take
as input a set of attributes S and output a key that identifies with that set.
• The TTP first chooses a random r 2 Zp,
• Then TTP chooses random r j 2 Zp for each attribute y j 2 S.
• Then TTP computes the key as:
SK = (D= g(a+r)=b ;8 j 2 S : D j = grH(y j)r j ;D0j = gr j):
Encryption and Decryption of the AND Chain
We now describe how to encrypt a AND-gate chain such that the attributes are exposed
gradually. We modify the CP-ABE encrypt and decrypt primitive functions to achieve
this goal (the original CP-ABE scheme is presented in Appendix A). We assume that
there is at least one attribute at each level of the AND-gate chain except the root.
Intuitively, the encryption and decryption algorithms works by using BSW scheme as
subfunction. Each AND-gate act as an subtree access policy to protect the attributes in
the same level. The exception is at the lowest level, while each other level’s attribute is
encrypted by the AND-gate subtree in the same level. For example, in Figure 6.2, the
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attribute y2 is protected by the AND-gate subtree, so that only if the decryptor possess
attribute y1, can he reveal y2 and proceed decryption. Moreover, instead of using
attribute strings, we use hash values of attributes. A user can check whether the hash
value match one of his attributes. On the other hand, this mechanism adds another
level of protection since it is hard to guess attributes from hash values.
y3 y3
y2
(a) (b) (c)
Current 
Decrypter
Current 
Decrypter
Current 
Decrypter
y3
y2
y1 y1
y2
y1
Figure 6.4: The process of decryption and attribute exposing. (a) Initially, all the at-
tributes are hidden; (b) y3 is exposed in the decryption process; (c) y2 is exposed in the
decryption process.
Encryption
The encryption algorithm encrypts a message M under the exposure schedule
T = y1 ! : : :! yn. The encryption algorithm is performed in the top-down manner.
Starting with level-0 AND gate x0, the encryption algorithm chooses a random s 2 Zp
and randomly chooses a 1-degree polynomial qx0 with qx0(0) = s. Then it calculates:
Cx0 =Me(g;g)
aqx0(0); C0x0 = g
bqx0(0):
For the level-1 AND gate x1, it randomly selects a degree-1 polynomial qx1 with
qx1(0) = qparent(x1)(index(x1)) = qx0(1). Then it calculates the hash value of level-1
attribute y1 as h1 = H(y1) and randomly chooses a k1 to encrypt h1 as fh1gk1 . Then, it
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computes:
Cx1 = k1e(g;g)
aqx1(0); C0x1 = g
bqx1(0):
For the level-1 attribute y1, it sets:
qy1(0) = qparent(y1)(index(y1)) = qx0(2):
Then, it computes:
Cy1 = g
qy1(0); C0y1 = H(y1)
qy1(0):
By repeating the process until the level n, for the level-m AND gate xm, the encryption
algorithm randomly selects a degree-1 polynomial qxm with
qxm(0) = qparent(xm)(index(xm))
.
Then it calculates the hash value of level-m attribute ym as hm = H(ym) and randomly
chooses a random key km to encrypt hm, i.e., fhmgkm . Then, it computes:
Cxm = kme(g;g)
aqxm(0); C0xm = g
bqxm(0):
For each level-m attribute ym, it sets:
qym(0) = qparent(ym)(index(ym)):
Then, it computes:
Cym = g
qym(0); C0ym = H(ym)
qym(0):
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Finally, we have the ciphertext CT as follows:
CT =fCx0 =Me(g;g)aqx0(0);C0x0 = hqx0(0);
hn;Cyn = g
qyn(0);C0yn = H(yn)
qyn(0)
8i 2 [1;n 1] :Cxi = kie(g;g)aqxi(0);
C0xi = h
qxi(0);fhigki ;
Cyi = g
qyi(0);C0yi = H(yi)
qyi(0)g:
Decryption Decryption algorithm is operated in a bottom-up fashion, as shown in Fig.
6.2, starting from the level-n attribute, where the level-n attribute is initially exposed.
The decryption algorithm calculates:
e(Di;Cyn)
e(D0i;C0yn)
=
e(gr H(i)ri;gqyn(0))
e(gri;H(i)qyn(0))
=
e(gr;gqyn(0))  e(H(i)ri ;gqyn(0))
e(gri;H(i)qyn(0))
= e(g;g)rqyn(0):
Since the level-(n 1) AND gate has only one attribute, it can derive:
e(g;g)rqxn 1(0) = e(g;g)rqyn(0):
Once the decryption algorithm derives the value e(g;g)rqxn 1(0), it calculates:
Cxn 1=(e(C
0
xn 1 ;D)=e(g;g)
rqxn 1(0)) = kn 1:
Then the decryptor decrypt the hn 1 checks whether one of his/her attributes has the
hash value hn 1. If found, he/she can find the attribute yn 1 and then continues the
decryption process through the following computations:
e(Di;Cyn 1)
e(D0i;C0yn 1)
=
e(gr H(i)ri;gqyn 1(0))
e(gri ;H(i)qyn 1(0))
=
e(gr;gqyn 1(0))  e(H(i)ri;gqyn 1(0))
e(gri;H(i)qyn 1(0))
= e(g;g)rqyn 1(0):
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The level-(n 2) AND gate is decrypted using the same method in level-(n 1) AND
gate operations except the level n 2 AND gate requires a degree-1 polynomial,
whereas level-(n 1) AND gate requires a degree-0 polynomial.
e(g;g)rqxn 2(0) = Õ
z2Sxn 1
(e(g;g)rqz(0))
Di;S0xn 1
(0)
= Õ
z2Sx
(e(g;g)rqparent(z)(index(z)))
Di;S0xn 1
(0)
= Õ
z2Sx
(e(g;g)
rqx(i)Di;S0xn 1 (0):
Where i= index(z), Sxn 1 = fxn 2;yn 2g and S0xn 1 = findex(z) : z 2 Sxn 1g.
If the decryptor cannot find corresponding attribute, he/she cannot decrypt one more
level to discover the next attribute. The same process for level-(n 2) is repeated for
each upper level to eventually recover message M. Brute force guessing the next level
attribute won’t help since the attacker can not check whether their guess is correct or
not.
Security Analysis of GIE
In this section, we analyze the security performance of the proposed scheme under
attacks to compromise the anonymity provided by GIE. Additionally, we will also
present the security strength of GIE encryption scheme.
To evaluate the anonymity strength of GIE encryption scheme, we present the
following lemma:
Lemma 9 At any given step from level n to level 1: (i) if attackers do not have the
attributes for the current level, attackers cannot reduce uncertainty to the next level,
and (ii) attackers cannot gain additional information by sharing their secret
information.
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Proof Sketch: To prove the first property, given the strength of a hash function and
meaningful terms used by attributes, attackers need to deploy dictionary attacks to
map a given attribute to exposed hash value at the current level. Since attackers do not
have the private key, it can only discover the attributes used by the next level. Thus,
the compromised privacy is restricted by one level of the AND-gate chain.
To address this vulnerability, the TTP can apply a keyed hash functionH on a given
attribute and give the hash value to the user. The secret key is only maintained by the
TTP. In this way, the inputs of the hash function can be considered as a random
number to prevent dictionary attacks. We must note that using the keyed hash function
will reduce the flexibility of GIE. This is because every user needs to predict attributes
that will be used and gets its corresponding secret key and hash values from the TTP
in advance.
To prove the second property, we need to note that malicious attackers can combine
their attributes and hash values to identify the hidden attributes. However, then GIE
encryption algorithm restricts them at the currently level if they share their own
secrets. For example, if attacker A has secrets for level-n attributes, and attacker B has
secret for level-(n 1) attributes. By share their secrets, they may reveal the attributes
used at the level-(n 1), however they cannot combine their secrets to correctly
decrypt the level-(n 1) gate. This is because the construction of the ABE decryption
scheme requires to use the same r value. However, the r values are not same for
different user when TTP distributing secrets to users. Thus, attackers cannot gain
additional information through colluding attacks. 
In the following context, we prove the presented GIE encryption scheme provides the
same security strength of the original CP-ABE scheme. To prove the security of GIE,
we reduce the proposed scheme to CP-ABE using the following lemma.
Lemma 10 The security strength of GIE encryption scheme is equivalent to CP-ABE
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scheme.
Proof Sketch: To prove that the proposed scheme is as secure as CP-ABE, we need to
prove that the added components in the ciphertext, namely Cxi ,C
0
xi , and hiki where
i 2 [1;n 1] do not reduce the security of the scheme. Other components of the
ciphertext are identical to CP-ABE scheme.
To prove that the additional components do not reduce the security of the proposed
scheme, we need to prove that, given theCxi andC
0
xi , the possibility that an attacker can
derive ki or e(g;g)aqxi(0) is negligible. Since ki is randomly chosen and e(g;g)aqxi(0) is
randomized in G2, deriving each of them based on known kie(g;g)aqxi(0) is hard.
Thus, assume that an attacker has e advantage in deriving ki or e(g;g)aqxi(0), the
attacker will have e advantage in CP-ABE. This is because CP-ABE uses the same
technique to protect the message. Thus, if CP-ABE scheme is secure, then the
proposed scheme is secure. Moreover, since the security of the proposed scheme can
be reduced to CP-ABE, it is collusion-resistant as CP-ABE. 
Performance Evaluation of GIE
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of GIE in the following aspects:
(i) communication overhead, and (ii) computation overhead. In the performance
comparison, we compare the proposed scheme with BSW CP-ABE scheme [7], CN
CP-ABE scheme [26], NYO scheme [69] and YRL scheme [96], which are described
in Related Work Section.
Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is incurred by the transmission of ciphertext. In the
proposed solution, for each AND-gate chain with n attributes, 3n members in G0 and
n members in G1 are required. Usually, the pairing takes the form
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e : E(Fpm)E(Fpkm)! Fpkm , where p is a prime, m a positive integer, and k is the
embedding degree (or security multiplier). Here, we use the classical algorithm of
Weil pairing with k = m= 1. We compare the proposed scheme with several CP-ABE
schemes in the Table 6.3:
Table 6.3: Comparison of Communication Overhead in Different Privacy Preserving
ABE Schemes.
Scheme
Name
Support
Anonymity
Attributes
Sup-
ported
Ciphertext
Size
BSW No ¥ (2n+1) G0 + 1
G1
CN No N (N+1)G0 + 1
G1
NYO YES N (2N+ 1) G0 +
1 G1
YRL YES N (2N+ 2) G0 +
1 G1
GIE YES ¥ 3n G0 +n G1
N: the number of predefined attributes and each
attribute has 3 values, namely True, False, and
Don’t Care; n: the number of user chosen at-
tributes.
Computation Overhead
We analyze the computation overhead of the proposed solution in terms of the number
of heavy cryptographic operations in the encryption and decryption process. For
encrypting an AND-gate chain with n attributes, we need 3(n 1) exponentiations on
G0 and n 1 exponentiations on G1.
For the decryption scheme, each attribute requires 2 bilinear pairings and each AND
gate requires 1 bilinear pairing. Thus, in an AND-gate chain with n attributes, the total
number of pairing operations is 3n. Comparing to BSW scheme, the total pairing
operations of GIE are increased by n times with added anonymity features. The
computation overhead of CN and YRL schemes depends on the predetermined value
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N, which is the total number of attributes in the system. Since the value of N can be
very big, thus CN and YRL schemes are not efficient. In the Table 6.4, we summarize
the computation overhead evaluated based on the number of pairing operations.
Table 6.4: Comparison of Computation Overhead in Different Privacy Preserving ABE
Schemes.
Scheme Name Number of Pairing Op-
erations
BSW 2n
CN N
YRL 2N
GIE 3n
N: the number of predefined attributes; n: the num-
ber of user chosen attributes.
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Chapter 7
Cloud Computing Perspective
In this chapter, we consider how to apply ABSS to the mobile cloud computing
paradigm. With the fast development of wireless technology, mobile cloud has
become an emerging cloud service model [50], in which mobile devices and sensors
are used as the information collecting and processing nodes for the cloud
infrastructure. This new trend demands researchers and practitioners to construct a
trustworthy architecture for mobile cloud computing, which includes a large numbers
of lightweight, resource-constrained mobile devices.
7.1 Overview
Existing cloud provides two main services: storage and computation. Data
confidentiality is a desired property when users outsource their data storage to public
cloud service providers. To protect users’ data, encryption is used to secure the data in
the cloud. Recently, Ciphtertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE)
schemes [7, 26, 16, 53] were proposed to facilitate key management and cryptographic
access control in an expressive and efficient way. Under the construction of CP-ABE,
an attribute is a descriptive string assigned to (or associated with) a user and each user
may be tagged with multiple attributes. Multiple users may share common attributes,
which allow message encryptors to specify a data access policy by composing
multiple attributes through logical operators such as “AND”, “OR”, etc. To decrypt
the message, the decryptor’s attributes need to satisfy the access policy. These unique
features of CP-ABE solutions make them appealing in the cloud data storage system
that requires an efficient data access control for a large number of users belonging to
different organizations.
With the CP-ABE enabled cloud storage service, a new challenge is how to
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incorporate wireless mobile devices, especially lightweight devices such as cell
phones and sensors, into the cloud system. This new challenge is originated from the
fact that CP-ABE schemes always require intensive computing resources to run the
encryption and decryption algorithms. To address this issue, an effective solution is to
outsource the heavy encryption and decryption computation without exposing the
sensitive data contents or keys to the cloud service providers. The proposed research
described in this paper proposes such a solution for CP-ABE.
Another research challenge is how to share encrypted data with a large number of
users, in which the data sharing group can be changed frequently. For example, when
a user is revoked from accessing a file, he/she is not authorized to access any future
updates of the file, i.e., the local copy (if exists) will get outdated. To this end, the
updated data need to be encrypted by a new encryption key.
Furthermore, the third research challenge is how to upload/download and update
encrypted data stored in the cloud system. For example, when changing certain data
fields of an encrypted database, the encrypted data needs to be downloaded from cloud
and then be decrypted. Upon finishing the updates, the files need to be re-encrypted
and uploaded to the cloud system. Frequent upload/download operations will cause
tremendous overhead for resource constrained wireless devices. Thus, it is desirable to
design a secure and efficient cloud data management scheme to balance the
communication and storage operational overhead incurred by managing the encrypted
data.
To address the above described research challenges, in this paper, I present a holistic
secure mobile cloud data management framework that includes two major
components:
1. Cloud-Assisted Attribute-Based Encryption/Decryption (CA-ABE) scheme;
2. An Attribute-Based Data Storage (ABDS) scheme that achieves information
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theoretical optimality.
Using CA-ABE, users can securely outsource computation intensive CP-ABE
encryption and decryption operations to the cloud without revealing data content and
secret keys. In this way, lightweight and resource constrained devices can access and
manage data stored in the cloud data store.
The ABDS system achieves scalable and fine-grained data access control, using public
cloud services. Based on ABDS, users’ attributes are organized in a carefully
constructed hierarchy so that the cost of membership revocation can be minimized.
Moreover, ABDS is suitable for mobile computing to balance communication and
storage overhead, and thus reduces the cost of data management operations (such as
upload, updates, etc.) for both the mobile cloud nodes and storage service providers.
7.2 System and Models
Notations
the notations used in this paper is listed in Table 7.2:
Table 7.1: Notations used in this paper.
Acronym Descriptions
DO Data Owner
DR Data Retriever
ESP Encryption Service Provider
DSP Decryption Service Provider
SSP Storage Service Provider
TA Trust Authority
T Access Policy Tree
System Model
In the proposed system, I denote the Data Owner as DO. The data are secured by
using the proposed CA-ABE scheme. Other than DO, there are many Data Retriever
(DR) who subscribe to the data owned by DO. A DO or DR can be a mobile wireless
110
Figure 7.1: System Architecture of The Proposed CA-ABE Framework.
device or a sensor that can request and/or store information from/in the Cloud.The
presented system model has the following properties:
1. The data must be encrypted before sending to storage service provider (SSP);
2. The encryption service provider (ESP) provides encryption service to the data
owner without knowing the actual data encryption key (DEK);
3. The decryption service provider (DSP) provides decryption service to users
without knowing the data content;
4. Even ESP, DSP and SSP collude, the data content cannot be revealed;
As shown in Figure 7.1, the SSP, ESP, and DSP form the core components of the
proposed system. ESP and DSP provide CA-ABE services and SSP, e.g., Amazon S3,
provides storage services. The cloud is semi-trusted, in which the cloud only provides
computing and storage services with the assistance on data security; however, the data
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is blinded to the cloud. In particular, more powerful PCs and Mobile Phones can
works as communication proxy for sensors that collect information.
Attacking Models
I assume that the symmetric encryption algorithm and one-way hash function used in
this paper is secure and the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DL) on both groups G0 and
G1 is hard. In addition, the Trust Authority (TA) is responsible for distributing
cryptographic keys, and it is well guarded and trustable. We consider the cloud service
providers are honest but curious [32]. In other words, the service providers will
perform in accordance to the proposed protocols and returns correct computation
results. Misbehavior can be easily detected and punished by the customers. However,
service providers will try to find out as much sensitive information (e.g., personal data,
keys, etc.) as possible and may collude with malicious attackers.
The malicious attackers’ goal is to reveal data in the cloud without authorization from
DOs. Multiple attackers can combine their secrets to perform collusion attacks, in
which they can try to decrypt the ciphertext and compromise the decryption keys that
they are not authorized to access. One particular example of this collusion attack is
that multiple users are revoked from accessing a file, and they try to collude to get
updated files from the public cloud.
In particular, attackers want to break the Forward Secrecy, which is defined as follows:
After a user is revoked from accessing a file, he/she may have a local copy of the file;
however, the revoked user must not get any future updates on this file.
While data integrity and retrievability in the cloud are also important security
requirements, they are not the focuses of this dissertation. Readers can refer to
research works in the provable data possession (PDP) [3, 35].
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Access Policy Tree
In this section, we briefly describe the model of an access policy tree used in
CA-ABE. The data access policy tree of CA-ABE is composed by leaf nodes and
internal nodes. Each leaf node represents an attribute, and each internal node is a
logical gate, such as “AND”, “OR”, “n-of-m”. Several functions and terms are defined
as follows to facilitate the presentation of the proposed solutions:
• parent(x): return the parent node of node x;
• att(x) denotes the attribute associated with the leaf node x in the data access
tree;
• The access tree T composed by a set of leaf nodes (i.e., attributes) and internal
nodes (i.e., logical gates) defines the data access policies, i.e., if a user owns a
set of attributes that satisfy the logic operations of the tree to reach the root, it
can access the secret secured by T . Here owns means that the user has the
private keys corresponding to the set of attributes. AND and OR are the most
frequently used logical gates.
• numx is the number of children of a node x. A child y of node x is uniquely
identified by an index integer index(y) from 1 to numx.
• The threshold value kx = numx 1 when x is an AND, and kx = 0 when x is an
OR gate or a leaf node. kx is used as the polynomial degree for node x using the
threshold secret sharing scheme [81].
7.3 Cloud Assisted Attribute Based Encryption
In this section, we present the construction of cloud assisted attribute based encryption
(CA-ABE) algorithm. In CA-ABE, DOs and DRs outsource intensive computation of
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Figure 7.2: Illustration of a sample CA-ABE access policy tree.
CP-ABE encryption and decryption to powerful cloud service providers (ESP and
DSP) without disclosing their data content and secret keys.
Overview of the Construction
Essentially, the basic idea of CA-ABE to outsource intensive but non-critical part of
the encryption and decryption algorithm to the service providers while retain critical
secrets. As we can prove later in this paper, the outsourcing of computation does not
reduce the security level compared with original CP-ABE schemes, where all
computations are performed locally.
The encryption complexity of CP-ABE grows linearly on the size of access policy.
During the encryption, a master secret is embedded into ciphertext according to the
access policy tree in a recursive procedure, where, at each level of the access policy,
the secret is split to all the subtree of the current root. However, the security level is
independent on the access policy tree. In other words, even if the ESP possesses
secrets of most but not all parts of the access policy tree, the master secret is still
information theoretically secure given there at least one secret that is unknown to ESP.
Thus, we can safely outsource most part of encryption complexity to ESP by just
retaining a small amount of secret information, which is processed locally.
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As for the decryption, the CP-ABE decryption algorithm is computationally expensive
since bilinear pairing operations over ciphertext and private key is a computational
intensive operation. CA-ABE addresses this computation issue by securely blinding
the private key and outsourcing the expensive Pairing operations to the DSP. Again,
the outsourcing will not expose the data content of the ciphertext to the DSP. This is
because the final step of decryption is performed by the decryptors.
7.4 System Setup and Key Generation
The TA first setups the CA-ABE system by choose a bilinear map: e :G0G0 !G1
of prime order dP with the generator g. Then, TA chooses two random a , b 2 Zp. The
public parameters are published as:
PK = hG0;g;h= gb ; f = g1=b ;e(g;g)ai: (7.1)
The master key is MK = (b ;ga), which is only known by the TA.
Each user (DO or DR) needs to register with the TA, who authenticates the user’s
attributes and generates proper private keys for the user. An attribute can be any
descriptive string that defines, classifies, or annotates the user, to which it is assigned.
The key generation algorithm takes as input a set of attributes S assigned to the user,
and outputs a set of private key components corresponds to each of attributes in S. The
key generation algorithm takes the following operations:
1. Chooses a random r 2 Zp,
2. Chooses a random r j 2 Zp for each attribute j 2 S.
3. Computes the private key as:
SK =hD= g(a+r)=b ;
8 j 2 S : D j = grH( j)r j ;D0j = gr ji:
4. Sends SK to the user through a secure channel.
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7.5 CA-ABE Encryption
To outsource the computation of Encryption and preserve the data privacy, a DO needs
to specify a policy tree T =TESP
V
TDO, where
V
is an AND logic operator
connecting two subtrees TESP and TDO. TESP is the data access policy that will be
performed by the ESP and TDO is a DO controlled data access policy. TDO usually has
a small number of attributes to reduce the computation overhead at the DO, in which it
can be a sub-tree with just one attribute (see the example shown in Figure 7.3).
In practice, if TDO has one attribute, DO can randomly specify an 1-degree
polynomial qR(x) and sets s= qR(0), s1 = qR(1), and s2 = qR(2). Then DO sends
fs1;TESPg to ESP, which is noted as:
DO
fs1;TESPg      ! ESP:
Here, we must note that sending s1 and TESP will not expose any secret of the
proposed solution. We will prove this in Section 7.8.
ESP then runs the Encrypt(s1;TESP) algorithm, which is described below:
1. 8x 2TESP, randomly chooses a polynomial qx with degree dx = kx 1, where
kx is the secret sharing threshold value:
a) For the root node of TESP, i.e., RESP, Chooses a dRESP-degree polynomial
with qRESP(0) = s1.
b) 8x 2TESP nRESP sets dx-degree polynomial with
qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)).
2. Generates a temporal ciphertext:
CTESP = f8y 2 YESP :Cy = gqy(0);C0y = H(att(y))qy(0)g;
where YESP is the set of leaf nodes in TESP.
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Figure 7.3: Illustration of access policy T =TESP
V
TDO.
At the meantime, the DO performs the following operations:
1. Performs Encrypt(s2;TDO) and derives:
CTDO = f8y 2 Y2 :Cy = gqy(0);C0y = H(att(y))qy(0)g:
2. Computes eC =Me(g;g)as and C = hs, whereM is the message.
3. Sends CTDO; eC;C to the ESP:
DO
fCTDO;eC;Cg       ! ESP:
On receiving the message from the DO, ESP generates the following ciphertext:
CT = hT =TESP
^
TDO; eC =Me(g;g)as;C = hs;
8y 2 YESP
[
YDO :Cy = gqy(0);C0y = H(att(y))
qy(0)i:
Finally, the ESP sends CT to the SSP.
7.6 Outsourcing Decryption
CP-ABE decryption algorithm is computationally expensive since bilinear pairing is
an expensive operation. CA-ABE addresses this computation issue by outsourcing the
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expensive Pairing operations to the DSP. Again, the outsourcing will not expose the
data content of the ciphertext to the DSP.
To protect the data content, the DR first blinds its private key by choosing a random
t 2 Zp and then calculates eD= Dt = gt(a+r)=b . We denote the blinded private key asfSK:
fSK = heD= gt(a+r)=b ;
8 j 2 S : D j = gr H( j)r j ;D0j = gr ji: (7.2)
Before invoking the DSP, the DR first checks whether its owned attributes will satisfy
the access policy T . If so, the DR sends ffSKg to the DSP, and requests the SSP to
send the ciphertext to the DSP. On receiving the request, the SSP sends
CT 0 = fT ;C = hs;8y 2 Y1SY2 :Cy = gqy(0);C0y = H(att(y))qy(0)g andCT 0 CT to
the DSP:
SSP
fCT 0g   ! DSP: (7.3)
Once the DSP receives both ffSKg and CT 0, it then runs the Decrypt(fSK;CT 0)
algorithm as follows:
1. 8y 2 Y = YESPSYDR the DSP runs a recursive function
DecryptNode(CT0;fSK;R), where R is the root of T . The recursion function is
the same as defined in [7] and DecryptNode(CT 0;fSK;y) is proceeded as follows:
DecryptNode(CT 0;fSK;y) = e(Di;Cy)
e(D0i;C0y)
=
e(gr H(i)ri;gqy(0))
e(gri ;H(i)qy(0))
= e(g;g)rqy(0)
= Fy:
The recursion is processed as follows: 8y is the child of x, it calls
DecryptNode(CT 0;fSK;y) and stores the output as Fy. Let Sx be an arbitrary
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kx-sized set of child nodes y, the DSP computes:
Fx = Õ
y2Sx
F
Di;S0x(0)
y
= Õ
y2Sx
(e(g;g)rqy(0))Di;S0x(0)
= Õ
y2Sx
(e(g;g)rqparent(y)(index(y)))Di;S0x(0)
= Õ
y2Sx
(e(g;g)rqx(i)Di;S0x(0)
= e(g;g)rqx(0); (7.4)
where i= index(z) and S0x = findex(z) : z 2 Sxg. Finally, the recursive
algorithm returns A= e(g;g)rs.
2. Then, computes
e(C; eD) = e(hs;gt(a+r)=b ) = e(g;g)trs  e(g;g)tas:
3. Sends fA= e(g;g)rs;B= e(C; eD) = e(g;g)trs  e(g;g)tasg to the DR:
DSP
fA;Bg   ! DR:
On receiving fA;Bg, DR calculates B0 = B1=t = e(g;g)rs  e(g;g)as and then it recovers
the message:
M =
eC
(B0=A)
=
Me(g;g)as
(e(g;g)rs  e(g;g)as)=e(g;g)rs :
7.7 Attribute Based Data Storage
In this section, we present an Attribute Based Data Storage (ABDS) scheme that is
based on CA-ABE to enable efficient, scalable data management and sharing.
Data Management Overview
The frequent data updates will cause additional expense for file managements. For
example, to update existing files, e.g., changing certain data fields of an encrypted
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database, in which the encrypted data need to be downloaded from SSP to DSP for
decryption. Upon finishing the updates, the ESP needs to be re-encrypted and upload
the data to the SSP. Thus, the re-encrypted process requires downloading and
uploading the data, which may incur high communication and computation overhead,
and as a result, will cost more for DOs.
To address the described cost issue, it is reasonable to divide a file into independent
blocks that are encrypted independently. To update files, the DO or DR can simply
download the particular blocks to be updated. In this way, we can avoid re-encrypting
the entire data. Moreover, data access control can be enforced on individual blocks
using “lazy” re-encryption strategy. For example, when the data access memberships
to a particular file are changed (i.e., the access tree is changed), this event can be
recorded but no file changes are invoked. Until the data content needs to be updated,
the re-encryption is then performed using the proposed CA-ABE scheme.
Partitioning the data into multiple small blocks also introduces addition overhead.
This is because the extra control information needs to be attached for each data block
for data management. For example, the control message should include a block ID
and a pointer to its corresponding data access tree T . In Figure 7.4, we depicted a
sample file stored in SSP. As shown in Figure 7.4, each file is divided into blocks. A
block is a tuple fBID, Ptr, Encrypted Datag, where BID is the unique identification of
the block; Ptr is the pointer to the control block CT; and data is encrypted with a DEK.
A control block fCID, Encrypted DEKg has a control block ID, i.e., CID and DEK
encrypted by using CA-ABE scheme.
The ABDS system should take into the considerations the issues on what is the
appropriate data block size to be partitioned with a known file size. In this work, the
goal is to minimize the storage and communication overhead with the considerations
the following simple assumptions:
120
Figure 7.4: Illustration a file organized into blocks with multiple control blocks.
1. Every data update should only affect a small amount of data, e.g., updating
certain data fields in the Database;
2. In each unit time period, the number of blocks to be updated is known;
3. Each data block has the same probability to be updated;
One exemplary application scenario that complies with those assumptions is the traffic
information collection, where lightweight devices, such as cell phone and sensors,
serves as mobile or static data collection agents. Periodically, the devices update the
corresponding data fields in encrypted databases.
Based on the above discussions, we can model the total cost C in a unit time period as
follows:
C = 2nSbCc+
F
Sb
ScCs; (7.5)
where n is the number of updated blocks in a unit time period and 2n stands for an
update includes one encryption and one decryption that require two transmissions; Sb
is the size of block; Cc is the cost rate of data transmission that is charged by both
cloud storage providers and wireless communication service providers; F is the size of
file; Sc is the size of control data for each data block, and Cs is the charging rate of
storage. To minimize cost C, DO or DR can minimize (7.5) and derive the optimal
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block size:
Sb  2
p
2nCcFScCs:
Setup
CA-ABE enables expressive policy with descriptive attributes to enforce data access
control to the stored data. For example, if Alice wants to share a file to all CS students,
she can specify the descriptive policy “CS AND Student”. All the users whose
attributes satisfy this policy can decrypt the data.
Besides the set of descriptive attributes enabled in the system, each user is assigned a
unique binary ID: b0b1 : : :bn 2bn 1. We can define the term “bit-assignment attribute”
that is represented as “Bi” or ”Bi” to indicate the binary value at position i in the ID. Bi
indicates the i’th bit of an ID is 1; Bi indicates the i’th bit of an ID is 0. If the length of
an ID is n, then the total number of bit-assignment attributes is 2n. This means that
two binary values are mapped to one bit position (one for value 0 and one for value 1).
Thus, a DO or DR with ID u is uniquely identified by the set of bit-assignments Su.
Also, multiple DOs and DRs may have a common subset of bit-assignments. For
example, a DO or DR u1’s ID is 000 and a DO u2’s ID is 001, Su1 = fB0;B1;B2g and
Su2 = fB0;B1;B2g and Su1
T
Su2 = fB0;B1g. Bit-assignment attributes can be used
when the DO wants to share data to any arbitrary set of DOs and DRs. In this case, it
may be hard to describe the set of DOs and DRs efficiently using descriptive attributes.
Upload New Files
Before uploading new files to the SSP, the ESP and DO need to determine the
encryption parameters such as the block size. DO then invokes ESP with an access
policy TESP, which is the access policy to be enforced on the uploaded files.
We first define some terms used in the following presentations:
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• Literal: A variable or its complement, e.g., b1, b1, etc.
• Product Term: Literals connected by AND, e.g., b2b1b0.
• Sum-of-Product Expression (SOPE): Product terms connected by OR, e.g.,
b2b1b0+b2.
Given the set of shared data receivers S, the membership functions fS(), which is in
the form of SOPE, specifies the list of receivers:
fS(bu1;b
u
2; : : : ;b
u
n) =
8><>: 0 iff u 2 S;1 iff u =2 S:
For example, if the subgroup S= f000;001;011;111g, then
fS = b0b1b2+b0b1b2+b0b1b2+b0b1b2.
Then, the DO runs the Quine-McCluskey algorithm [62] to reduce fS to minimal
SOPE fminS . The reduction can consider do not care values  on those IDs that are not
currently assigned to any DO to further reduce number of product terms in the
membership function. For example, if S= f000;001;011;111g, fminS = b0b1+b1b2.
Since fminS is in the form of SOPE, TESP can be formulated in disjunctive normal form
(DNF). That is, for each product term E in fminS , the DO specifies an product termW
using the following rules:
1. For positive literal bi 2 fminS , set B+i inW .
2. For negative literal bi 2 fminS , set B i inW .
In consequence, the access policy TESP is in the following format: TESP =W1
W   Wk.
For example, if S= f000;001;011;111g, fminS = b0b1+b1b2. We can find that fminS
contains 2 product terms and TESP contains 2 AND gates connected by the root OR
gate.
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Finally, DO uploads the data blocks and the control block to SSP, where each data
block is encrypted by the DEK and DEK is protected by the access policy in control
block.
Data Updates
Now, we investigate into how to efficiently handle the data updates, i.e., how to
modify encrypted data with or without changing data access control policy. Data
Updates With Access Policy Change In Section 7.7, we described the “lazy”
re-encryption strategy adopted by DOs. Using the “lazy” re-encryption scheme, the
DO continuously records the revoked data receivers. When there is a need to modify
the data, the DO will choose a new data access tree that can revoke all previously
recorded data receivers.
When DO updates a data block with access policy change, we need to consider the
following cases:
• If there is no control block associated with the latest access policy, i.e., no data
updates occurred after the latest access policy change event, the DO encrypts a
new random DEK associated with the latest access policy with CA-ABE and
attach a new control block to the end of the file, see Figure 7.4.
• If there exists a control block associated with the latest access policy, i.e., at
least one data block was encrypted with the newest access policy, the DO can
simply re-direct the control block pointer, see Figure 7.4, to the control block
associated with the latest access policy.
• If a control block is not pointed by any data block, this control block should be
deleted.
Updates Without Access Policy Change: If no change is required to the access policy,
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DO can simply perform the CA-ABE scheme and upload the updated data block in the
SSP. The Block ID and the pointer to control the block are not changed.
7.8 Evaluation
In this section, we first present the security assessments of the presented solution.
Then, we present the computation, communication, and storage performance
evaluation.
Security Evaluation
The data structure of ciphertext and private key in CA-ABE is the same as the original
BSW CP-ABE[7], thus CA-ABE can be viewed as a variation of CP-ABE. However,
in CA-ABE, the access policy tree is constructed by two sub-trees T =TESP
V
TDO.
In general, TDO contains a single attribute to reduce the computation and
communication overhead. Thus, DO randomly specifies a 1-degree polynomial q(x)
and sets s= q(0), s1 = q(1) and s2 = q(2). The tuple fs1;TESPg is sent to ESP. It is
easy to prove that, based on the threshold secret sharing scheme [81], for a given
1-degree polynomial q(x), knowing s1, secrets s and s2 are information theoretically
secure.
Based on the security assumptions presented in Section 7.2, ESP, DSP and SSP are
untrusted but honest service providers that will perform according to protocol and
returns correct results. In order to compromise users’ secret information, the ESP,
DSP and SSP can perform collusion attacks. In this scenario, an authorized user u0
who satisfies the access tree T provides his blinded private key fSK to the DSP for
decryption. Then, ESP and DSP can try to utilize the blinded private key of u0 to
derive M from Me(g;g)as. ESP has s1, and thus it can easily derive e(g;g)as1 . This is
because e(g;g)a is available from the public parameters presented in (7.1). As the user
u0 satisfies the access policy TDO, DSP can derive the following values e(g;g)r
0s1 ,
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e(g;g)r
0s2 , e(g;g)r
0s, and e(g;g)tas+tr
0s through the Fx function (see (7.4)) without
knowing alpha and r0. In the Table 7.2, we listed all rational terms that are available to
ESP and DSP.
Table 7.2: List of rational terms available to ESP and DSP in CA-ABE.
ESP s1 e(g;g)as1 gb s1 gs1=b
DSP e(g;g)r
0s1 e(g;g)r
0s2 e(g;g)r
0s e(g;g)tas+tr
0s
As we can see, ESP has the values s1 and e(g;g)as1 , but it is unaware of values s2 or s.
DSP possesses more terms as well as the blinded private key fSK of u0 (see (7.2)). We
must note that fSK is not a valid CP-ABE private key, since the eD= gt(a+r0)=b is
embedded with tr0 and ta , and the rest of all private key components
f8 j 2 S : D j = gr0 H( j)r j ;D0j = gr jg are embedded with r0. Essentially, this blinded
private key can be a valid CP-ABE private key when (i) the master key is
MK = fb ;gtag; (ii) a colluding user contributes D= gt(a+r0)=b , which is a valid
component embedded with tr0; and (iii) a colluding user contributes
f8 j 2 S : D j = gr0 H( j)r j ;D0j = gr jg, which are binded by a random r0, which is
different from tr0 in D. Since the t is the exponent of the generator g, deriving it is
equivalent to solve the DLP problem, which is considered to be hard. Thus, given the
security of secret sharing and hardness of DLP on G0 and G1, ESP and DSP cannot
derive e(g;g)as2 or e(g;g)as even if they collude.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, I evaluated the proposed framework components. Computation
Performance of CA-ABE: To evaluate the performance of the presented CA-ABE
scheme, we evaluate the computation overhead of service providers and users based
on both theoretical analysis and experimental results.
Firstly, we analysis the number of expensive cryptographic operations over G0 and
G1, i.e., pairing, exponentiation, multiplication, performed by service providers and
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users’ devices. In the analysis we assume that the access policy TESP has a1 attributes
connected by an AND logical gate and TDO only has 1 attribute. In addition, the root
node is an AND gate.
In the Table 7.3, we compared the number of exponentiations, multiplications and
hash to G0 operations incurred on ESP side and user side in the encryption
outsourcing, where a1 is the number of attributes in TESP:
Table 7.3: Comparison of Computation on ESP Side and User Side in the Encryption
Outsourcing.
Exp G0/G1 Mul G1 Hash to G0
ESP 2a1=0 0 a1
User 3=1 1 1
We also provide a comparison of the number of exponentiations, multiplications,
inversion, and pairing operations incurred by decryption outsourcing on DSP side and
user side as shown in the Table 7.4, where a1 is the number of attributes in TESP:
Table 7.4: Comparison of Computation on DSP Side and User Side in the Decryption
Outsourcing.
Exp G1 Mul G1 Inv G1 Pairing
DSP a1 2a1 a1 2a1+1
User 1 2 1 0
From the above analysis, we can see that the computation overhead is linear for
service providers (ESP and DSP) and constant for the user. Among all operations,
pairing is most computationally intensive.
We also conduct the experimental evaluation of cryptographic pairing and ECC
operations on a wireless Mote sensor (8 bit-7.37 MHZ ATMega128L, 4KB RAM).
The testing results are listed in the Table 7.5:
Apart from the theoretical analysis, we also performed experimental measurements.
Based on the CP-ABE open source project [7], we implemented and evaluated the
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Table 7.5: Computing Pairing and ECC in Wireless Sensors.
Pairing Exp G0 Mul G0
Sensor 31250 ms 10720 ms 196 ms
CA-ABE on a PC with 1.6GHz Intel Atom processor running Linux 2.6.32. The
computation time is measured using clock ticks returned by clock t clock(void)
function in standard C library. To illustrate that most of the computation overhead is
outsourced to service providers, we run the user and server on the same platform and
recorded the number of clock ticks are recorded. In the Figure 7.5, we compared
computation overhead incurred on service providers and users in encryption and
decryption outsourcing. The computation overhead is calculated in terms of 10 based
logarithms, i.e., log10, of thousands (K) clocks ticks. As we can see from the figure,
more than 90% of encryption and more than 99% of decryption computation are
performed by the service providers.
Figure 7.5: Performance evaluation of the encryption and decryption outsourcing.
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Table 7.6: Comparison of Ciphertext Storage Overhead and Key Storage Overhead in
Different Cryptographic Access Control Schemes
Scheme Ciphertext Storage Key Storage
single data receiver multiple data receivers TA User
ABDS O(logN) t O(log2N) O(1) O(logN)
Subset-Diff O(t2  log2t  logN) O(t2  log2t  logN) O(N) O(t log t logN)
BGW1 O(1) O(1) N/A O(N)
BGW2 O(N
1
2 ) O(N
1
2 ) N/A O(N
1
2 )
ACP O(N) O(N) O(N) O(1)
N: the number of group members; t: maximum number of colluding
users to compromise the ciphertext.
Storage Performance of ABDS
We analyze the storage performance of ABDS and compare it with several related
cryptographic access control solutions: broadcast encryption schemes (Subset-Diff)
[37], BGW broadcasting encryption [14], access control polynomial (ACP) scheme
[101].
The performance is assessed in terms of cipher-text storage overhead, key storage
overhead (system parameters and public/private keys stored on the users and TA). We
denote the total number of users in the system with N and a user wants to share a file
to any given set of receivers in the system. The comparative results are presented in
Table 7.6.
Ciphertext Storage Overhead In Subset-Diff scheme, the size of ciphertext is
O(t2  log2t  logN), with t as maximum number of colluding users to compromise the
ciphertext. For BGW scheme, the ciphertext size is O(1) or O(N
1
2 ) as reported in [14].
In ACP scheme, the size of message depends on the degree of access control
polynomial, which equals to the number of current receivers. Thus, the message size
is O(N). To control a set of receivers S using ABDS, the size of ciphertext depends on
the number of product terms in the fminS (see 7.7). In [80], the authors derived an upper
bound and lower bound on the average number of product terms in a minimized
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SOPE. Experimentally, the average number of message required is  log(N) [25].
Key Storage Overhead Compared with Broadcast Encryption schemes, ABDS
greatly reduced the Key Storage Overhead of the TA and users’ devices. In ABDS, the
PK and MK is of constant size. Also, a user needs to store log(N) bit-assignment
attributes. Thus, the storage overhead is O(logN), assuming a user does not store any
IDs of the data receivers. Although the DO may need the list of data receivers’ IDs
along with the list of do not care IDs to perform Boolean function minimization, we
can argue that this does not incur extra storage overhead.
• The data publishers do not need to store the receiver’s IDs after the broadcast;
thus, the storage space can be released.
• The TA can periodically publish the minimized SOPE of all do not care IDs,
which can be used by data publishers to further reduce number of messages.
• If IDs are assigned to users sequentially, i.e., from low to high, TA can simply
publish the lowest unassigned IDs to all users, who can use the all higher IDs as
do not care values.
• Even if a user needs to store N IDs, the space is merely N logN bits. If N = 220.
• If a data publisher cannot utilize do not care values to further reduce the
membership function in SOPE form, the ciphertext storage overhead might be a
little higher.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
In this chapter, I conclude this dissertation. In this dissertation, I proposed a
framework of efficient and scalable Attribute Based Security Systems (ABSS),
including efficient and privacy preserving attribute based encryption schemes with
application to group communications and cloud computing.
8.1 Efficient Attribute Based Encryption
First of all, I improved the efficiency of Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) by
substantially reduce the size of ciphertext while retaining the same functionality and
security. I construct an efficient Constant Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based
Encryption (CCP-ABE) scheme that can encrypt a message with an AND-gate access
policy with wildcards. Moreover, CCP-ABE supports non-monotonic data access
control policy. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first construction that achieves
these properties. Also, the proposed ABE scheme is fully collusion-resistant such that
any number of users can not combine their attributes to elevate their decryption
capacity.
8.2 Optimal Group Communication based on ABE
Next step, I applied the proposed efficient ABE scheme to construct optimal group
communication schemes and broadcast encryption schemes.
Optimal Group Key Management
I proposed an attribute based key distribution scheme – OGK that attains
communication-storage optimality without collusion vulnerability.
OGK is the first work that achieves storage-communication optimality with constant
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message size and immune to collusion attack. It outperforms existing group key
management schemes in terms of communication and storage efficiency.
To the best of my knowledge, OGK is first such construction that achieves all of
following properties:
• Given any number of revoked GMs, the number of encrypted key-update
messages is information theoretically minimized to  O(logN).
• The size of each encrypted key-update message is constant.
• The communication overhead of GM addition is O(1), i.e., only single multicast
message is required.
• The storage overhead of GC and GM is O(logN) if GC does not store IDs of
GMs.
• OGK is collusion resistant and provides forward and backward group key
secrecy.
• OGK supports dynamic subgroup communication efficiently.
Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption
Based on CCP-ABE, I presented an Attribute Based Broadcast Encryption (ABBE)
scheme. Compared with existing BE schemes, ABBE is flexible as it uses both
descriptive and non-descriptive attributes, which enables a user to specify the
decryptors based on different abstraction levels, with or without exact information of
intended receivers. Moreover, ABBE demands less storage overhead compared to
existing BE schemes. ABBE exploits the many-to-many nature of attributes to
dramatically reduce the storage complexity from linear to logarithm and enable
expressive attribute based access policies. I proved that the construction requires
minimal storage to support all the possible user group formations for BE applications.
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8.3 Privacy Preserving Attribute Based Security System
I also explored the privacy issues in ABSS in two ways.
Firstly, I constructed an efficient Privacy Preserving Constant Ciphertext Policy
Attribute Based Encryption (PPC-CP-ABE) scheme that enforces hidden conjunctive
access policies with wildcards in constant ciphertext size. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first construction that achieves these properties.
Secondly, I proposed a new concept – Gradual Identity Exposure (GIE) to address the
restrictions of hidden policy based ABE schemes. The proposed approach is to reveal
the receivers’ information gradually by allowing ciphertext recipients to decrypt the
message using their possessed attributes one-by-one (but not all). If the receiver does
not possess one attribute in this procedure, the rest of attributes are still hidden.
Compared to hidden-policy based solutions, GIE provides significant performance
improvement in terms of reducing both computation and communication overhead.
GIE has the following capabilities:
• A user’s identity is exposed step-by-step based on receivers’ authorized
capabilities. It each step, the decryptor needs to satisfy certain attributes to
reveal next step attributes. Otherwise, decryption fails immediately and the
decryptor learns nothing more than the attributes he/she is entitled. More
importantly, the unintended receivers quit decryption procedure as early as
possible to save computing power. This is fundamentally different to the rigid
concept of using hidden policy: “Try to decrypt the entire ciphertext, if it is
decrypted, the policy will be revealed; otherwise, policy will be absolutely
unknown”, where most receivers will waste computing power on unintended
ciphers.
• GIE is flexible in that it does not require a pre-established policy agreement.
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Each user can specify a procedure to expose an identity gradually, based on
his/her security requirements without negotiating with the message receivers.
This property makes the identity management adaptable in various
un-predictable application scenarios.
• GIE can incorporate security data access policies effectively, when considering
the procedures of exposing attributes as security policies. The gradual exposure
property of GIE enables an identity management system to reveal an identity in
a prioritized fashion, which can help a secure system to build a hierarchical
identity management system.
• GIE can be integrated with role-based data access control naturally. GIE reveals
attributes of the role information in a step-by-step fashion based on receivers’
role, which can be used as role-based data access control without major
modifications.
8.4 Cloud Computing Perspective
Last but not least, I consider the incorporation of ABSS in the mobile cloud
computing scenarios. In the proposed scheme, the light weight mobile devices can
securely outsource expensive ABE operations to untrusted cloud service providers. To
this end, I presented a holistic secure mobile cloud data management framework that
includes two major components:
1. Cloud-Assisted Attribute-Based Encryption/Decryption (CA-ABE) scheme;
2. An Attribute-Based Data Storage (ABDS) scheme that achieves information
theoretical optimality.
Using CA-ABE, users can securely outsource computation intensive CP-ABE
encryption and decryption operations to the cloud without revealing data content and
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secret keys. In this way, lightweight and resource constrained devices can access and
manage data stored in the cloud data store.
The ABDS system achieves scalable and fine-grained data access control, using public
cloud services. Based on ABDS, users’ attributes are organized in a carefully
constructed hierarchy so that the cost of membership revocation can be minimized.
Moreover, ABDS is suitable for mobile computing to balance communication and
storage overhead, and thus reduces the cost of data management operations (such as
upload, updates, etc.) for both the mobile cloud nodes and storage service providers.
8.5 Limitations and Future Works
The limitations and corresponding future works of the proposed ABSS are listed as
follows:
• The proposed efficient ABE scheme requires a pre-defined number of attributes.
Also, only ANG gate policy can achieve constant ciphertext. The future
improvements include removing the restrictions on the pre-defined attributes
and providing more flexible access policies format with constant ciphertext size.
• Currently, the proposed scheme focuses on the confidentiality by constructing
efficient Attribute Based Encryption schemes. In the future, efficient Attribute
Based Signatures schemes should be proposed to achieve more security features.
• The cloud assisted ABE (CA-ABE) scheme only support BSW cp-abe scheme.
The future direction is to develop a framework for secure outsourcing of
attribute based cryptographic algorithms.
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CP-ABE scheme utilizes Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [12] and threshold secret
sharing scheme [82]. A brief description of CP-ABE protocols and their working is
illustrated in Table A.1. For more details, interested readers refer to [7].
Table A.1: CP-ABE Protocols
Protocol 1 Setup
1. Construct bilinear map e : G0G0 ! G1 of prime order
p with a generator g;
2. Choose random numbers a;b 2 Zp;
3. Calculate the system public key PK =
he;G0;G1;H;g;h = gb ;z = e(g;g)ai and private mas-
ter keyMK = hb ;gai, where H : f0;1g!G0.
Protocol 2 KeyGen(MK ;S )
For user i= 1; : : : ;n:
1. Choose random numbers ri and r j 2 Zp, 8 j 2
attribute set S ;
2. Calculate SK i = hDi = g(a+ri)=b ;8 j 2 S : Di; j =
griH( j)r j ;D0i; j = g
r ji.
Protocol 3 Encrypt(PK ;k;PT )
1. Create access treePT ;
2. Choose polynomial qx(0) 8x 2PT ;
3. Starting from root R ofPT , choose DEK k 2 Zp and set
qR(0) = s where R is the root ofPT ;
4. S is the set of leave nodes ofPT , calculates cipher text
CT
CT = hPT ; eC= kz s;C= hs;8 j 2S :C j = gq j(0);8 j 2
S :C0j = H( j)
q j(0)i;
Protocol 4 Decrypt(CT ;SK )
1. DecryptNode(CT ;SK ;x)=
e(Di;x;Cx)
e(D0i;x;C0x)
= e(g;g)riqx(0),
8x 2PT ;
2. Using a recursive procedure and DecryptCiphter method,
compute the DEK DecryptCipher(CT ;SK ;R) =eCe(g;g)ris
e(C;Di)
= k.
For detailed descriptions on generations of private keys SK , ci-
phertext CT , and function DecryptNode, please refer to [7].
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DecryptNode(CT ;SK ;x) takes as input a ciphertext CT , a private keySK ,
which is associated with a setS of attributes, and a node x from the attribute tree
PT . If j is the attribute value of the node x and x is a leaf node, then we can compute
the following formulas for vehicle i:
DecryptNode(CT ;SK ;x)
=
e(Di;Cx)
e(D0i;C0x)
= e(g;g)riqx(0)
We now consider the recursive case when x is a non-leaf node. The algorithm
DecryptNode(CT ;SK ;x) then proceeds as follows: For all nodes z that are
children of x, it calls DecryptNode(CT ;SK ;z) and stores the output as Fz. LetSx
be an arbitrary kx-sized set of child nodes z such that Fz 6=?. If no such set exists then
the node was not satisfied and the function returns ?. Otherwise, compute
Fx = Õ
z2Sx
F
D j;S 0x(0)
z = Õ
z2Sx
(e(g;g)riqz(0))D j;S 0x (0);
= Õ
z2Sx
(e(g;g)rqparent(z)(index(z)))D j;S 0x (0);
= Õ
z2Sx
e(g;g)riqx( j)D j;S 0x (0);
= e(g;g)riqx(0);(using polynomial interpolation)
where j = index(z) andS 0x = findex(z) : z 2Sxg.
The decryption algorithm begins by calling the DecryptNode function on the root
node R of the tree T . If the tree is satisfied byS we set
z = DecryptNode(CT ;SK ;R) = e(g;g)riqR(0) = e(g;g)ris:
146
